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Abstract
We propose to study electricity capacity remuneration mechanism design through a principal-agent approach. The principal
represents the aggregation of electricity consumers (or a representative entity), subject to the physical risk of shortage, and the
agent represents the electricity capacity owners, who invest in capacity and produce electricity to satisfy consumers’ demand,
and are subject to financial risks. Following the methodology of Cvitanić et al. (2017), we propose an optimal contract, from
consumers’ perspective, which complements the revenue capacity owners achieved from the spot energy market, and incentivizes
both parties to perform an optimal level of investment while sharing the physical and financial risks. Numerical results provide
insights on the necessity of a capacity remuneration mechanism and also show how this is especially true when the level of
uncertainties on demand or production side increases.
Key words. Capacities market, capacity remuneration mechanism, principal-agent problem, contract theory.
1 Introduction
Electricity market is characterized by the constraint that production must be equal to the consumption at any time. In case of
non respect of this constraint, the system can incur a power outage whose consequences might be highly problematic. For
example, the total economic cost of the August 2003 blackout in the USA was estimated to be between seven and ten billion
dollars (Council (2004)). This blackout resulted in the loss of around 62 GW of electric load that served more than 50 million
people at the USA-Canada border. Besides, it took 2 days for major affected areas to have the power restored, while some
regions had to wait up to a full week.
As electricity can hardly be stored; hydro storage is limited in size, and developing a large fleet of batteries is still highly
costly, the power production capacity must be high enough to cope with major peak load events which can reach extreme
levels compared to the average load. In France for example the average load was around 55GW in 20171, whereas the peak
of electricity consumption record was above 100 GW in February 2012. Indeed, electrical load is characterized by a high
variability implied by meteorological variations and economic conditions on different time scales. Again, in France for example,
the difference between peak load in 2012 and 2014 is around 20 GW, which corresponds to an equivalent capacity of around 40
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT) of 500 MW2. To ensure security of supply, most electricity systems specify the Loss of
Load Expectation (LoLE) which is a reliability target for the electricity system, and has been fixed in some countries at three
hours at most per year Newbery (2016).
The consequence of such constraints on the production system is that some power plants are used rarely (only during
extreme peak load) but remain necessary for the system security, and insuring their economical viability with energy markets
only is not guaranteed. This question has already motivated a great amount of economic literature under the name of
“missing money” Joskow (2006). This lack of revenue can occur because of energy market imperfections such as price caps or
out-of-market actions made by the transmission system operator as well as reliability targets going beyond reliability outcome
provided by the market.
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The “missing money” issue might be further increased when the share of renewable energies increases in the system Newbery
(2016). Indeed, renewable energies have low variable costs so their introduction has made electricity prices lower. See Brown
(2018) or Levin & Botterud (2015) for a proof that subsidized renewable capacity pushes downward energy prices. This
could result in the withdrawal of most expensive power plants, jeopardizing the security of electricity system and the lack of
incentives to invest in new capacities.
In addition, even without the “missing money” problem, electricity markets are highly volatile for the reasons already stated
(i.e. low level of storage, high uncertainties on load and production levels induced by outages and meteorological conditions
impacting the production capacities) and suffer from “missing markets” issues Newbery (2016) such as the horizon shortness of
contracts proposed by electricity markets compared to the lifetime of power-plants. For all these reasons, the financial risk is
particularly high for investors in electricity capacities and may lead to high hurdle rates, see Hobbs et al. (2007) for a model
which studies how capacity markets variations can lower capital costs for generators by reducing risks).
For all the reasons cited above, several regions of the world have decided to put in place a capacity remuneration mechanism
(CRM), in addition to energy markets. This kind of markets aims at insuring a payment for electricity generating assets for the
capacities they provide, regardless of their actual production. This market can be thought of as a payment for an insurance
provided by the power plant against shortage and blackout risk. However, no consensus on the design of such CRM arose so far,
see for example Bublitz et al. (2019) for a review of theoretical studies and implementations of CRM or Bhagwat et al. (2017)
for a survey of different capacity markets implemented in the USA.
In Scouflaire (2018), the author argues that CRM do improve security of supply, in exchange of a significant impact on
consumer’s bill in the USA, as opposed (surprisingly) to the EU where the impact on the end users price is not significant. An
analysis of the impact of capacity on welfare under a price-capped electricity market is made on the Texas market (ERCOT) in
Bajo-Buenestado (2017) showing that capacity markets have several effects: an increase of the wholesale electricity price and
reliability and a reduction of price volatility. Several mechanisms and their corresponding conditions for achieving efficiency are
studied in Léautier (2016). In Briggs & Kleit (2013), distortion of capacity markets implied by subsidies of base load capacities
are pointed out and correction mechanisms such as the minimal offer price rule (MOPR) tested in the PJM markets are studied.
Currently in Europe, several designs of CRM have been adopted such as a market capacity for example in the United Kingdom,
France, Italy, Belgium and Ireland3(under construction); a capacity payment as in Spain or Portugal; strategic reserves in
Sweden or in Germany.
In the literature, several papers study different CRM designs with distinct modeling approaches. For example in Hary et al.
(2016), the authors compare the benefits of capacity markets or strategic reserves versus energy-only design in terms of security
of supply, investment and generation costs in a dynamic model of investing. This is the same approach developed by Hach et al.
(2016) and applied to the UK market. Höschle et al. (2017) analyse the impact of capacity mechanism on energy markets and
on the remuneration of flexibility and emission-neutral renewable capacities. In Bhagwat et al. (2017), the authors implement
the UK capacity markets in an Agent-based model where Agents have a limited vision of the future. In Hermon et al. (2007),
the authors model two CRMs–in particular under information asymmetry–using agency theory. They model capacity payments
as a menu of contracts and strategic reserves as a retention rule of a bilateral contract between the TSO and a producer and
then compare these CRMs. The information asymmetry is mainly on the “type” of the generator, namely its access to the
capital market which impacts its efficiency.
In this work, we propose a principal-agent framework to shed light on the design of CRM in a context of informa-
tion asymmetry and external uncertainties (in production and demand). Using the recent developments of contract
theory Cvitanić et al. (2018), we model and solve the problem in a continuous time setting, which allows us to dive
deeper into the incentive mechanism, and provide a recommended policy for investment in electric power plants, with an
optimal dynamic capacity payment allowing for an efficient (financial and physical) risk sharing between consumers and producers.
In the scope of the paper, producers and retailers are fully separated and exchange electricity through spot markets, and
the electricity demand is considered to be inelastic. The relationship between consumers and producers is modeled by a
principal-agent problem, with the principal being the aggregation of power consumers (or an equivalent entity representing
them), and the agent the collection of producers. Note that the transmission system operator (TSO) which operates in real-time
in many electricity markets could be considered as a representative entity of the aggregation of consumers.
3See https://www.sem-o.com/markets/capacity-market-overview and https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_17_4944.
2
Our model accounts for the information asymmetry on the actions of the agent –moral hazard–, i.e., consumers do not observe
producers’ actions but only the results of their actions. In fact, consumers want to incentivize producers in an optimal way to
provide electricity when needed, but at the same time they have no information on the commitment of the latter (producers) to
build or maintain power plants, as they only observe the volume of electricity produced, not the effort of capacity owners to install
new power plants or to keep the existing ones in good operation conditions. The model developed enables us to specify an optimal
contract which incentivizes the producers to make the right level of investment to achieve a certain level of security for the system.
This proposed contract remunerates the capacity owners depending on realized uncertainties on the demand and available
capacities while sharing the financial risks between consumers and producers. It is also shown that the more uncertainties on
the system, such as the increase share of variable renewable capacities, the more a capacity remuneration is needed to ensure
correct levels of investment and maintenance.
Finally, we provide a numerical illustration of the optimal capacity payment obtained with our proposed optimal contract,
compared with the payment supplied by the spot market. This numerical illustration is inspired by the French electricity
system.
The second section of this paper is devoted to the presentation of the model and the objective functions of both the agent
and the principal, with a brief summary of the resolution methodology (the details of which are left to the Appendix). In
the third section, we present our case study; the French electricity system and provide some numerical interpretations of the
optimal capacity payment. Mathematical proofs and details are included in the Appendix for the sake of clarity.
2 The model
In order to study CRM in a context of information asymmetry, we propose a non-zero sum Stackelberg game with a principal-
agent formulation, i.e., the gain of one party does not come necessarily from the loss of the other. In this setting, the aggregation
of consumers or an entity representing them such as the TSO, proposes to producers a capacity payment which optimally
complements the revenue they (producers) obtain on the spot energy market. This payment incentivizes them to invest optimally
in power plants management (construction, maintenance, etc..) to ensure an acceptable level (for consumers) of shortage
occurrences. The proposed payment is a way to correct the information asymmetry faced by consumers (as they cannot observe
directly producers decisions concerning the capacities of the production mix, thus the need for incentive), and to share the risks
coming from demand and available capacities uncertainties between the two parties. Moreover, the proposed payment limits
producers’ potential abuse of market power. Indeed, without capacity payment, producers may decide to under-invest in order
to obtain high remunerations from a spot market with more shortages and price spikes.
2.1 Principal-Agent Problem: a brief review
Contract theory, or principal–agent problem, is a classical moral hazard problem in microeconomics. The simplest formulation
involves a controlled process X and two parties; the principal and the agent. The controlled process is called output process
and represents the value of the firm for example. Principal owns the firm, and delegates its management to agent, i.e., the
control of the output process X. So principal hires agent at time t = 0 for the period [0, T ], in exchange for a terminal payment
(a contract) ξ paid at time T , based upon the evolution of the output process during the contracting time period. In other
words, ξ is an FT –measurable random variable, (a function of the realized uncertainties on X up to time T ), and thus can be a
function of the firm value (a percentage of the final gain for example, or a function of the whole trajectory, etc..). However,
agent’s effort is not observable and/or not contractible for principal, which means that ξ cannot depend on the effort (work) of
agent, hence the moral hazard.
Each of the parties aims at maximizing a utility function. The agent acts on the output process X via some control α (his
management decision) and has to pay a cost cA (α) as a function of the efforts (the management decision α), and expects a
payment ξ from principal at time T . Agent also has a reservation utility UA (R), to be thought of as a participation constraint,
with R the cash equivalent of this constraint: agent accepts the contract ξ only if ξ satisfies V A (ξ) ≥ UA (R), otherwise he will
refuse it. In the case where agent accepts the contract, we can formulate his problem as follow:
V A (ξ) = sup
α
E
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
cA (αt) dt
)]
. (2.1)
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The principal benefits from the output process X, and so incites agent to put the effort α (to work hard) via the contract ξ.
Principal tries to find the optimal incentive (ξ), while respecting agent’s participation constraint. Principal’s problem is written
therefore as:
V P = sup
ξ
V A(ξ)≥UA(R)
sup
α?(ξ)
E
[
UP
(
−ξ +Xα?(ξ)T
)]
, (2.2)
where the contract ξ satisfies the participation constraint V A (ξ) ≥ UA (R) and α?(ξ) denotes agent’s optimal effort
(response) given the contract ξ, i.e., the solution to (2.1). The first supremum (over α?(ξ)) expresses the fact that
given a contract ξ, agent solves his problem (we will see later that the existence of at least one solution is guaranteed).
Then in case of existence of multiple solutions to (2.1), we assume that agent would choose the one which maximizes
principal’s value function (once his utility maximized, agent is cooperative with principal). We refer the interested reader to
Cvitanić & Zhang (2013), and Cvitanić et al. (2018) for a more detailed exposition of contract theory and principal-agent problem.
As mentioned before, in our model, principal is the aggregation of consumers or an equivalent entity representing them, and
agent is the collection of producers. In the sequel we will ease the presentation by referring to these two parties by simply
saying “the consumer” and “the producer”.
So agent is the producer who exerts an effort (a process which we will denote α), to build or invest in the maintenance of
peak power plants, to increase the total capacity of the fleet. Agent is compensated an amount ξ by principal (the consumer)
for the utility received; the satisfaction of consumption and the insurance against shortage risk. We also account for the
moral-hazard (second best in principal-agent terminology), in the sense that effort performed by the agent is not observable by
principal. Therefore, principal does not observe α, and is not able to know if the available capacity is the result of decisions
of maintenance and investments made by agent, or if it is due to market conditions not controlled by the producer, such as
unanticipated failures, good or bad weather conditions for renewable energy sources of production. In mathematical words, the
capacity compensation ξ given to the producer, cannot be a function of the effort α.
2.2 Model, state variables and control
We fix a maturity T ∈ (0, +∞), and describe the system with two continuous processes XC and XD, denoting respectively
the electricity generation capacity available at each time t ∈ [0, T ] and the instantaneous electricity demand, both in
GigaWatt (GW). XC represents the aggregation of all production capacities, regardless of the corresponding produc-
tion technology. The uncertainty of XC represents the power outages of conventional power plants and the variability of
the availability factor of renewable productions. We denote the state variableX :=
(
XC , XD
)ᵀ, a stochastic process valued in R2.
Agent (electricity producers) controls the generation capacity XC via an F–predictable process (αt)t∈[0,T ]; at each
time t ∈ [0, T ] the control is only based on information prior to t without knowledge of the future. The control α is
expressed as a yield in [Year]−1 and represents the decision at each time t to change the generation capacity by building
or dismantling peak power plants; gas turbines for instance. This restriction in the choice of only one technology for the
control (maintaining/building or destroying) simplifies parameters calibration and allows for the use of a continuous time setup.
Numerically, this is approximated by a small-step discretization as peak power plants are quite rapidly adjustable. The control
is only on the average value of the available capacity and not the volatility, which spares us a lot of technicalities. Indeed,
one could expect that investing in wind power or solar panels would increase the uncertainty of available generation capacity
(volatility), as opposed to thermal plants which have a more controllable production.
The instantaneous available capacity process XC is driven by a controlled geometric Brownian motion, which has the
property of staying positive consistent with available capacity. XC starts from xC0 and has the infinitesimal increments over dt:
dXCt = αtXCt dt+ σCXCt dWC,αt , for t in [0, T ], (2.3)
where αtXCt dt is the variation on average capacity implied by the effort α and σCXCt dWC,αt is the stochastic part in
the available capacities due to uncertainties, with σC > 0 the volatility parameter. Remark that we overlook ageing and
deterioration in our model, which is justified by taking a short maturity T compared to the average lifetime of power plants.
The demand XD is modeled as the exponential of a mean reverting process to ensure that XDt > 0, for t in [0, T ], and that
the demand oscillates around some average level. The initial condition is fixed as XD0 = xD0 , and the infinitesimal variation over
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dt is modeled by:
d log
(
XDt
)
= µD
(
mD − log
(
XDt
))
dt+ σDdWDt , for t in [0, T ]. (2.4)
The term σDdWDt is the random part in the variation with σD > 0, and mD ∈ R the long term average (of log
(
XDt
)
) and
µD > 0 the speed of mean reversion.
We denote by U the set of admissible control processes α, defined as the F–predictable processes valued in the compact
interval [αmin, αmax], with αmin < 0 and αmax > 0, which implies that construction and dismantling are both allowed. The
restriction α ∈ [αmin, αmax] although reasonable from an economical perspective, will only be used to simplify the rigorous
mathematical resolution of the problem, and so |αmin| and |αmax| are set arbitrarily large.
We write in a more compact form the dynamic of the state variables
Xt = x0 +
∫ t
0
µ (Xs, αs) ds+
∫ t
0
σ (Xs) dWαs , ∀t ∈ [0, T ], (2.5)
with α the control process, x0 ∈ R2+ a fixed initial condition and
µ (x, α) := µ˜ (x) +
(
αxC
0
)
, and σ (x) :=
(
σCxC 0
0 σDxD
)
, (2.6)
with
µ˜ (x) :=
(
0(
µD
(
mD − log
(
xD
))
+ σ
2
D
2
)
xD
)
, (2.7)
or equivalently(
XCt
log
(
XDt
) ) = ( xC0log (xD0 )
)
+
∫ t
0
(
αsX
C
s
µD
(
mD − log
(
XDs
)) ) ds+ ∫ t
0
(
σCXCs 0
0 σD
)
dWαt . (2.8)
Remark 2.1. In reality, the processes XC and XD exhibit a strong seasonal behavior (annual, weekly and daily patterns).
These seasonalities are explained by patterns of electricity consumption in day to day life and weather conditions (heating in
winter, solar production in the day ...). For expository purposes, we consider a deseasonalized version of state variables. The
aim of this simplification is to focus the analysis on random consumption peaks, and how they should be dealt with, as opposed
to seasonal variations which can be anticipated.
Remark 2.2. Power demand is considered to be inelastic with respect to electricity prices.
Remark 2.3. Even though we work on the space of processes valued in R2, our model ensures that X takes only positive
values, in R2+, since the capacity process XC follows a log-normal distribution, and XD is defined as the exponential of an
Ornstein Uhlenbeck process. One could simplify the model and define these two variables as the canonical processes on the
space of exponentials of continuous functions. This would indeed simplify the description of the dynamics. Adjustements of the
cost functions would also be required. However, the numerical calibration on real data of these adjusted costs is not possible, so
we chose to keep on with the current model.
Remark 2.4. As mentioned above, the capacity and demand processes defined by the controlled SDE (2.5) are both non
negative. However, they are unbounded from above and have poor integrability properties which could cause technical issues
especially since we will be using exponential utility functions.
To avoid this problem we define an arbitrarily large constant x∞ ∈ R+, and the function x 7→ x := x ∧ x∞. So whenever
necessary we will use XC = XC ∧ x∞ and XD = XD ∧ x∞ or the vector version defined componentwise, i.e., X =
(
XC , XD
)ᵀ.
Remark that since x∞ can be set arbitrarily large, it neither impacts the results nor represents a restriction on the capacity or
the demand.
2.3 Spot energy payment
Without capacity payment, the only transaction between consumers and producers is the reward for energy production. This
reward corresponds to the spot price of electricity. Therefore, for a time interval [0, T ], the consumer pays for his consumption
the amount
ST :=
∫ T
0
s(Xt)dt, (2.9)
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and the producer receives ST , where s : R2 → R+ is the reward per unit of time, defined as
s(x) := P (x)xC ∧ xD, (2.10)
and P : R2 → R+ is the spot price function which we define as
P (x) := β0e−β1(x
C−xD), with β0, β1 > 0. (2.11)
Note that the spot energy payment only accounts for delivered energy, i.e., the minimum between the demand and available
capacity; the requested power XD in standard situations, and just the available capacity XC in the case of a shortage. Different
choices of electricity spot price functions can be found in Aïd (2015) or Aïd et al. (2009) and our model is directly inspired by
them. In particular, the function P in (2.11) captures a key feature in our problem: the relationship between the spot price
and the residual capacity (XC −XD). In the sequel, we will call ST the spot payment. Remark that ST represents a cost for
the Principal and a reward for the Agent.
2.4 Producer’s problem
The agent is the electricity producer, and provides consumer with electricity, for a terminal payment ξ + ST . The producer is in
charge of choosing the investment policy in power plants via the process α, and is subject to its costs.
We model producer’s instantaneous costs as a quadratic function of state variables
cA(x, α) := c˜A(x) + κ1(αxC) + κ2
(αxC)2
2 , for (x, α) ∈ R
2
+ × [αmin, αmax], and κ1, κ2 > 0. (2.12)
The term κ1(αxC) + κ2 (αx
C)2
2 is the cost of building or dismantling peak power plants, where κ1 is the cost per unit, and κ2 is
a penalization adjustment term as the quadratic cost of construction, since the marginal cost of building at a given time step is
increasing. We define then
c˜A(x) := axC + b(xC ∧ xD), with a, b > 0, (2.13)
where the first term is the cost of maintenance and the second models the variable cost of production. These variable costs of
production are proportional to the available generation capacity xC and the minimum between this capacity and demand xC∧xD.
During the time period [0, T ], producer provides electricity to consumer, and receives the payment ξ + ST at time T . The
amount ξ represents the payment producer receives for the availability of capacity, in addition to the spot payment ST .
To include the moral hazard in our problem, we use the weak formulation and so we introduce Pα, the law of the process X,
weak solution of the stochastic differential equation (2.5) with a control process α, and P the set of probability measures Pα.
The producer’s objective function or his average perceived utility is defined as
JA0 (ξ,Pα) := EP
α
[
UA
(
ξ + ST −
∫ T
0
cA (Xt, αt) dt
)]
, for (ξ,Pα) ∈ Ξ× P, (2.14)
for a given contract ξ ∈ Ξ and a choice of α ∈ U to which we associate the probability measure Pα ∈ P, and where UA is a
utility function expressing the risk aversion; increasing and concave. For tractability, we choose an exponential utility function,
UA(x) := − exp(−ηAx) with ηA > 0, the agent’s risk aversion. A rigorous definition of P and Ξ is provided in Appendix 5.1,
along with the weak formulation of the problem.
The producer is encouraged to provide enough capacity, otherwise the consumer would reduce his payment ξ. The moral
hazard is modeled by adding the restriction that the payment ξ is a function only of X, not α or Pα. So ξ is FT –measurable,
where FT by definition models the information gathered from the observation of the process X up to time T , and ξ is a
function of this information. That is to say the consumer only observes the state variables X as stochastic processes, and
has no access to the control α or Pα and cannot see if the randomness of X is coming from external uncertainties or from
producer’s actions. In other words, the producer controls the law Pα of the process X, i.e., the probability of having some
trajectories rather than others, and the consumer observes the realized trajectory and fixes the payment ξ as a function of X.
We stress here that an important feature of our model is that the structure of the contract is defined ex-ante while its exact
value is provided only ex-post depending on the realized uncertainties.
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In addition, the producer has a participation constraint UA (R) ∈ R, with R ≥ 0 its cash equivalent. Thus, producer will
accept the contract ξ only if he can expect to retrieve from ξ a utility above the level UA (R). Indeed, the producer has no
obligation to accept the contract and is free to refuse it before the start of the time period [0, T ].
Whenever the producer accepts a given contract ξ, he wants to make the optimal investment by choosing an appropriate
control Pα. Producer (agent) solves the problem
V A0 (ξ) := sup
Pα∈P
JA0 (ξ,Pα) . (2.15)
An agent’s control Pα? ∈ P (ξ) (or equivalently α? (ξ)) is said to be optimal if it satisfies
V A0 (ξ) = JA0
(
ξ, Pα
?
)
. (2.16)
We denote by P? (ξ) the set of agent’s optimal controls for some admissible contract ξ.
2.5 Consumer’s problem
The consumer buys and consumes electricity from the producer during the time period [0, T ] and pays for the energy consumed
at the spot price ST =
∫ T
0 s(Xt)dt, and a capacity remuneration given by the contract ξ. Consumer gets an instantaneous
utility from electricity consumption, and a disutility in case of shortage. We therefore model consumer (principal) overall
instantaneous utility as
cP (x) := θ
(
xC ∧ xD
)
− k
(
xD − xC
)+ with θ, k > 0. (2.17)
The first term represents consumers’ reservation value or their willingness to pay for effective consumption (which is
min
(
xC , xD
)
). The larger θ, the more valuable consumption to the consumers. In the literature, θ is often set using the Value
of Lost Load (VOLL) Fabra (2018).
The second term can be thought of as consumer’s disutility induced by the risk of total or partial blackout. Indeed, in
critical situations where some shortage (whenever available capacity is less than the total demand), the system operator’s
ability to keep the system running decreases and total (all the system) or partial (large geographical zones) blackout may occur.
The coefficient k is defined to represent this disutility, which is represented in the model with a function proportional to the
level of shortage (the higher the shortage level, the higher the risk of blackout). This term plays a role of “punishment”–via
the contract– for producer whenever there is a failure to provide sufficient generation capacity to cover the instantaneous demand.
Altogether, consumer’s objective function or expected utility is defined as
JP0 (ξ,Pα) := EP
α
[
UP
(
−ξ − ST +
∫ T
0
cP (Xt) dt
)]
, for (ξ,Pα) ∈ Ξ× P, (2.18)
with UP denoting principal’s utility function, similar to agent’s utility function with a risk aversion ηP ;
UP (x) := − exp (−ηPx) with ηP > 0. (2.19)
Principal’s goal is to choose the optimal incentive (payment) for the agent to make an optimal effort. Principal’s problem is
written
V P0 := sup
ξ∈Ξ
sup
Pα∈P?(ξ)
JP0 (ξ,Pα) , (2.20)
i.e., given the optimal response of the agent to the compensation scheme, the Principal chooses the best contract which
maximizes supPα∈P?(ξ) JP0 (ξ,Pα). Furthermore, (as stated earlier) we assume that when given different optimal controls, agent
will choose the one that maximizes principal’s objective function, which is a standard assumption in contract theory Cvitanić &
Zhang (2013), Holmström & Milgrom (1987), Sannikov (2008).
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2.6 Optimal contract and capacity payment
To find producer’s and consumer’s optimal policy, we follow the approach presented in Cvitanić et al. (2018) for principal-agent
problems. We start by considering a special class of contracts; the “revealing contracts” as capacity payments. These contracts
satisfy the incentive compatibility property, which means that consumer provides them with a recommended policy (or effort)
for producer, and producer’s optimal response to these contracts corresponds to the recommended effort. Therefore, the
consumer can maximize his utility over the set of revealing contracts by identifying first producer’s response and choosing the
best trade-off between the payment of the contract and utility induced by the corresponding response.
We next use a representation result to prove that any contract can be represented as “revealing”, and thus there is no loss
of generality or utility for consumers in optimizing only over such contracts.
In mathematical words we solve the problem for contracts which can be written as a terminal value of a (spe-
cial) controlled forward stochastic differential equation (SDE) designed to make agent’s response “predictable”. Then we
prove that we can associate to any admissible contract such a controlled SDE, obtained by solving an appropriate backward SDE.
The revealing contracts are introduced via an appropriate parametrization of contracts; principal considers the contract as a
terminal value of a controlled diffusion process, and controls its initial level and the increments linear in the state variable. The
class of revealing contracts Z is then defined as
Z :=
{
Y Y0,ZT for some (Y0, Z) ∈ R× V with Y Y0,ZT ∈ Ξ
}
, (2.21)
where V is the set of F-predictable processes Z valued in R2 satisfying some integrability conditions (rigorously defined in
Appendix 5.2.1), and
Y Y0,Zt := Y0 +
∫ t
0
Zs · dXs −
∫ t
0
H (Xs, Zs) ds, for all t ∈ [0, T ] , (2.22)
with H corresponding to producer’s Hamiltonian, defined by
H (x, z) := sup
α∈[αmin,αmax]
h (x, z, α) , for (x, z) ∈ R2 × R2, (2.23)
and h : R2 × R2 × [αmin, αmax]→ R defined as
h (x, z, α) := z · µ (x, α) + s(x)− cA (x, α)− ηA2 |σ(x)z|
2, for (x, z, α) ∈ R2 × R2 × [αmin, αmax]. (2.24)
For completeness, we provide a derivation of the class of revealing contracts in Appendix 5.2.2.
We denote by αˆ : R2 → [αmin, αmax] the maximizer of h which can be easily computed
αˆ
(
xC , zC
)
:= αmin ∨
(
zCxC − κ1xC
(xC)2κ2
)
∧ αmax, for
(
xC , zC
)
∈ R2 with xC > 0, (2.25)
where xC (respectively zC) denotes the first component of x (respectively z). The function αˆ will be referred to as the
“recommended effort”–Sannikov (2008)–, and can be reasonably approximated when |αmin| , αmax, x∞ → +∞ as
αˆ
(
xC , zC
)
≈ z
C − κ1
xCκ2
for
(
xC , zC
)
∈ R2 with xC > 0. (2.26)
We will stick to the expression (2.25) for the mathematical proofs, and use the approximation (2.26) for the interpretations.
Remark that the process (Y Y0,Zt )t∈[0,T ] depends only on observations of X (consumption and available capacities) which are
observable by Principal, as opposed to the effort α and the Brownian motion Wα. This is consistent with the moral-hazard of
this problem.
The revealing contracts class Z plays a central role in principal-agent problems. Not only does it allow principal to predict
agent’s optimal control, but also to overcome the main difficulty; the non-Markovianity of ξ, i.e., the dependence of the
payment on the whole paths of the demand XD and the capacity XC .
We can interpret the revealing contract as a performance index, closely related to agent’s continuation value, which comes
with a recommended effort αˆ defined in (2.25); recall that the actual effort provided by agent is neither observable, nor
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contractible, and therefore principal can only propose αˆ as a recommendation and not an obligation.
Nevertheless, Proposition 2.5 proves that whenever agent (producer) is rational -which is a reasonable assumption- he
will follow the recommended effort since it maximizes his expected utility, and so principal (consumer) can predict agent’s
(producer’s) effort. Furthermore, Proposition 2.6, identifies Z to Ξ, meaning that any admissible contract can be represented as
a revealing one. We present these two results and provide their proofs in the Appendix.
Proposition 2.5. For every contract Y Y0,ZT in the class Z, producer’s value function is characterized as
V A0
(
Y Y0,ZT
)
= UA (Y0) , (2.27)
and his optimal control is given by consumer’s recommended effort
(
αˆ
(
XCt , Z
C
t
))
t∈[0,T ].
The proof is reported in Appendix 5.3.
Proposition 2.6. Let ξ ∈ Ξ. Then there exists a pair (Y0, Z) ∈ Z such that{
Y Y0,ZT = ξ,
dY Y0,Zt = Zt · dXt −H (Xt, Zt) dt.
(2.28)
Furthermore,
EP
αˆ [
e(ηA∨ηP )(1+δ) supt∈[0,T ]|Yt|
]
< +∞. (2.29)
In particular, Z = Ξ, and therefore
V P0 = sup
Y0≥R
sup
Z∈V
JP0
(
Y Y0,ZT ,P
αˆ
)
. (2.30)
The proof is reported in Appendix 5.4.
The main conclusion is that there is no loss of generality in restricting consumer’s problem to contracts in Z, which are
general enough (since Z = Ξ), and properly parameterized to make producer’s response predictable (by proposition 2.5) . So
consumer only needs to solve the reduced problem (2.30), i.e., to maximize his objective function over the set Z (with the two
new control variables Y0 and Z). This corresponds to a Markovian stochastic control problem which can be solved by standard
techniques, and is the object of Proposition 5.6 reported in Appendix 5.5.
By virtue of Proposition 5.6, we can provide a straightforward decomposition of Principal’s optimal control in different parts as
in the following Corollary 2.7.
Corollary 2.7. Under the assumptions of Proposition 5.6, Principal’s optimal contract ξ? can be written as ξ? := Y R,Z
?
T with
the following decomposition:
Y R,Z
?
T = R+
∫ T
0
Z?t · dXt −
∫ T
0
H (Xt, Z?t ) dt, (2.31)
or equivalently,
Y R,Z
?
T + ST = R+
∫ T
0
cA
(
Xt, αˆ
(
XCt , Z
?,C
t
))
dt+
∫ T
0
Z?t · σ (Xt) dW P
αˆ
t +
ηA
2
∫ T
0
|σ (Xt)Z?t |2dt. (2.32)
with (Z?t )t∈[0,T ] defined in (5.72) and αˆ the recommended effort function defined in (2.25).
This optimal contract consists in a terminal payment to the producer of the random amount Y R,Z
?
T , which incites him to
follow the recommended effort. Note that any different effort (from the producer) would be sub-optimal in terms of his utility
by Proposition 2.5.
Remark 2.8. We can make some observations on the remuneration of the producers and the optimal recommended effort:
(i) Under smoothness assumptions on consumer’s certainty equivalent u (the solution of PDE (5.60)), the recommended effort(
αˆ(XCt , Z?,Ct )
)
t∈[0,T ] is a feedback control as a function of X
C
t and ∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ). Recall
αˆ
(
XCt , Z
?,C
t
)
= αmin ∨
(
Z?,Ct X
C
t − κ1XCt
(XCt )2κ2
)
∧ αmax, (2.25)
≈ Z
?,C
t − κ1
XCt κ2
for |αmin| , αmax, x∞ → +∞, (2.26)
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and from the definitions (5.72) and (5.66), and the approximation (5.68) when |αmin| , αmax, x∞ → +∞,
Z?,Ct =
ηP (σCxC)2 + 1κ2
(
XCt
XC
t
)2
(ηA + ηP )(σCXCt )2 + 1κ2
(
XC
t
XC
t
)2 ∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ) + κ1κ2
(
XCt
XC
t
)
−
(
XCt
XC
t
)2
(ηA + ηP )(σCXCt )2 + 1κ2
(
XC
t
XC
t
)2 ,
≈ ηP
(
σCXCt
)2 + 1
κ2
(ηA + ηP ) (σCXCt )
2 + 1
κ2
∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ).
(2.33)
Therefore, for t ∈ [0, T ] and a given position (XCt , XDt ) the rate of investment αˆ recommended by consumer is a function of the
capacity XCt and ∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ); the sensitivity of his certainty equivalent with respect to capacity at time t. The latter
term depends on the triplet (t,XCt , XDt ), and so the recommended effort depends obviously on XC , and implicitly on t and
XD through the sensitivity of consumer ∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ). This point will be further highlighted with numerical experiments.
(ii) Since the effort
(
αˆ(XCt , Z?,Ct )
)
t∈[0,T ] is defined as a rate (in [Year]
−1), it can be better understood by observing the process(
XCt αˆ(XCt , Z?,Ct )
)
t∈[0,T ] which corresponds to the actual construction or dismantling of power plants (in [GW/Year]) which is
given from the previous expressions as
XCt αˆ
(
XCt , Z
?,C
t
)
≈ 1
κ2
ηP
(
σCXCt
)2 + 1
κ2
(ηA + ηP ) (σCXCt )
2 + 1
κ2
∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt )−
κ1
κ2
,
≈ w(X
C
t )∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt )− κ1
κ2
,
(2.34)
with w(XCt ) ∈ (0, 1) a positive weight function related to the risk aversion of producer (because ηA > 0). In the extreme case
ηA → 0, w(XCt ) = 1 and the recommended effort becomes clear; the (linear) marginal cost of construction is κ1, and so the
optimal control is to construct if ∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ) > κ1 and dismantle power plants if ∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ) < κ1. In particular, αˆ
depends only on the certainty equivalent of consumer (and XC), not producer, since the latter is compensated by the contract
instead. The general case ηA > 0, with 0 < w(XCt ) < 1 needs further considerations in terms of the magnitude of the sensitivity
∂xCu(t,XCt , XDt ) to offset the weight w(XCt ), but leads to similar results.
(iii) Y R,Z
?
T covers all the costs the producer has to pay to follow the recommended capacity policy (2.25) and to produce
electricity to match the demand. Therefore, the optimal contract compensates those costs taking into account what the producer
is earning on the spot market. We recall below producer’s costs (we omit the truncation function for exposition clarity)∫ T
0
cA
(
Xt, αˆ
(
XCt , Z
?,C
t
))
dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Producer’s costs
=
∫ T
0
κ1αˆ
(
XCt , Z
?,C
t
)
XCt + κ2
(
αˆ
(
XCt , Z
?,C
t
)
XCt
)2
2 dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Construction costs
+
∫ T
0
aXCt dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maintenance costs
+
∫ T
0
b(XCt ∧XDt )dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Production costs
,
(2.35)
(vi)Y R,Z
?
T shares the risk (realized uncertainties on demand and capacity) between producers and consumers, by transferring part
of the randomness to the agent, while providing him with a risk compensation at the same time, to overcome his risk-aversion:
Risk part =
∫ T
0
Z?t · σ (Xt) dW αˆt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk shared
+ ηA2
∫ T
0
|σ (Xt)Z?t |2dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk compensation
, (2.36)
and the risk shared can be interpreted as a “reward for good luck” and a “punishment for bad luck” as in Hoffmann & Pfeil
(2010), for both of the external noises WC and WD, which is possible since the contract is defined ex-ante and paid ex-post. In
particular, our model accounts for the risk on the uncontrolled demand XD in two ways; through the recommended effort (as
explained in (i) and (ii)), and the optimal contract via the “Risk shared” term.
(v) Y R,Z
?
T is a random variable which depends on the scenario. In particular, its value changes as the uncertainties change, and
might even become negative. This means that agent might earn less or more than his total costs, depending on the outcome
of uncertainties (for example very sunny or windy years might lead to low spot prices and therefore to a higher capacity
remuneration). Nevertheless, in expectation, agent (producer) is guaranteed to earn R; the cash equivalent of the reservation
utility.
(vi) We can rewrite the decomposition (2.32) as follow:
Capacity remuneration + Spot compensation = R+ Producer’s costs + Risk shared + Risk compensation. (2.37)
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2.7 Producer’s participation constraint: the problem without capacity payment
In absence of a capacity payment, producer’s only income is the spot compensation and therefore his problem is a standard
Markovian stochastic control problem:
Vˆ A0 := V A0 (0) = sup
Pα∈P
EP
α
[
UA
(
ST −
∫ T
0
cA (Xt, αt) dt
)]
, for Pα ∈ P. (2.38)
In this case, the consumer has no bargaining power and no control on investment decisions in capacity, and is then subject to
shortage risk. The producer does not care anymore about consumer’s value function, and there is no guarantee that a criteria
such as the LoLE constraint is satisfied (recall that the Loss of Load Expectation (LoLE) is the targeted maximum number of
hours of shortage per year, set at 3 hours per year for most European countries).
Because of the structure of the spot function (decreasing in xC − xD), the producer makes a compromise between having
few installed capacities (less than in the case with a capacity payment) to save maintenance costs and increase the spot prices,
and enough capacities to satisfy (part of) the demand, to earn more on the spot market (since only sold energy generates a
cash flow). Remark that this kind of arbitrage can be seen in practice even among producers in perfect competition.
The resolution of problem (2.38) is the object of Proposition 5.8 reported in Appendix 5.6. In the absence of a contract,
producer’s value function Vˆ A0 , i.e., the solution to problem (2.38) given in Proposition 5.8 provides a good proxy for the
participation constraint, which we define as follow :
R := U−1A
(
Vˆ A0
)
∨ 0. (2.39)
The maximum is taken in the previous equation between 0 and U−1A
(
Vˆ A0
)
as the producer has two choices: to operate the
power plants if U−1A
(
Vˆ A0
)
≥ 0 and earn the spot price which provides a utility Vˆ A0 , or (if U−1A
(
Vˆ A0
)
< 0), to stop all activities
which would lead to 0 earnings (assuming that we neglect any agency costs related to bankruptcy).
3 Numerical results and interpretations
In this section our model is numerically solved for a stylized system, based on the French electricity power system. We implement
the optimal capacity contract and optimal policy, by numerically solving the PDE (5.60) describing consumer’s value function,
with parameters calibrated on the French power system. Then we observe multiple scenarios and the evolution of state variables
under this policy. A more precise description of the numerical resolution procedure is provided in Appendix 5.7.
3.1 Case study: the French power system
We consider a time horizon T = 5 [Years], and we discretize it with a time step ∆t = 1400 [Years] for the diffusion of state
variables, roughly speaking, over one time step per day.
The state variables XC and XD are expressed in GW, and the contract and costs (quantities inside of the utility function)
are in 106e, ([Me]). As stated earlier, XC is the instantaneous overall available capacity, and the control is only on the peak
power plants which are assumed to be gas turbine.
3.1.1 Capacity and demand
We use the generation capacity, demand and spot prices available online4 for the time period 29/06/2009-15/12/2014. Remark
that we stop at 2014 because the latest available capacity data is provided in that year, as the French TSO stopped publishing
available capacity records on an aggregated basis per technology. Nevertheless, the French production mix did not change a lot
in the past period, and we can reasonably assume that the uncertainties on capacity generation remain unchanged too.
We start by calibrating the parameters of SDE (2.5) modeling the dynamics of XC and XD. As mentioned in Remark 2.1, we
only consider deseasonalized state variables in our model. Therefore, to deseasonalize the input data, we use a locally weighted
scatterplot smoothing algorithm implemented in the software R; the function “STL” which decomposes time series into three
components: a trend, a seasonal component and a residual noise. This algorithm extracts the trend by averaging locally, then
computes the seasonality on residuals by averaging across a given frequency. Once the seasonal component is computed, it is
subtracted from the original time series to get the deseasonalized data. We apply this procedure twice; once for the annual
4The French TSO RTE website for capacity and demand https://clients.rte-france.com, and the EPEX SPOT website https://www.epexspot.com
for spot prices.
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seasonality and another time for the weekly seasonality.
The demand XD modeled as the exponential of an Orstein–Uhlenbeck process is calibrated by linear regression of the
returns of daily data fixed at 7 p.m., the hour of the day with the highest demand.
As for the capacity XC , we take the daily sum of the different generation technology capacities: nuclear, gas, coal, fuel,
hydro-power (reservoir and run-of-the-river) and then σC is calibrated as to have simulated trajectories with similar behaviour
with historical (observed) capacity data.
Table 1 summarizes our estimated parameters for capacity and demand processes, and we can see in figure 1 a comparison
between historical (deseasonalized) data with generated scenarios of demand and capacity with our calibrated parameters.
Parameter Value Unit
Available
generation capacity x
C
0 90 [GW]
σC 0.1 [Year]−
1
2
Demand
xD0 60 [GW]
µD 61.92 [Year]−1
exp
(
mD
)
60 [GW]
σD 0.86 [Year]−
1
2
Table 1: Calibrated parameters for capacity and demand. This table provides the set
of parameters for which our model fits the deseasonalized data of the French generation
capacity and demand over the time period 29/06/2009− 15/12/2014.
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Figure 1: Comparison between historical data and simulated processes. The black line
represents the evolution of the historical data (generation capacity (GW) in the left figure
and demand (GW) in the right figure), plotted against a simulated trajectory (in red) with
our model and the calibrated parameters of table 1.
3.1.2 Spot price function
We calibrate our spot price function P defined in (2.11) using historical data, and taking one price per day, at 7 p.m.; the
same as for demand data (the hour of daily demand peak). The calibration is simply done by taking the log of the time series,
and then applying a linear regression. Remark that the spot price function P is completely characterized by the capacity and
demand, so the seasonality is naturally accounted for. Table 2 summarizes our choice of the spot price function P with its
calibrated parameters, and the figure 2 represents a comparison between historical and simulated spot prices.
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Model: [Me][GW][Year] Parameter Value Unit
Spot price function P (x) = β0e−β1(x
C−xD) β0 102.8 [e/MWh]
β1 335.3× 10−4 [GW]−1
Table 2: Spot price model and its calibrated parameters. The first column recalls the
model of electricity spot price as a function of the capacity margin (xC − xD), and the last
three columns provide the parameters of this model calibrated on the French electricity
spot prices.
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Figure 2: Historical and estimated spot prices in euros. In black
the historical spot prices, and in red the reconstruction of the
spot price using the function P from table 2 and the historical
realizations of demand and capacity generation.
Remark that our model reproduces quite well the behaviour of spot prices but without the largest peaks. This is coherent
with a market with a low price cap (a price cap which can be seen for example in many European countries).
3.1.3 Costs
Electricity supplier has to take into account the construction, maintenance and production costs of different power plants. These
costs are provided by the French TSO and WEO 20185. The cost of maintenance a and the cost of production b in [e/MWh]
are estimated as weighted averages between the different costs of technologies, where the weights used for maintenance are the
same as for the installed capacities, and those for production costs are taken as the proportions of production; cf Table 3.
5See the “WEO 2018 report” and “Impact assessment of the French Capacity Market, 2018.” by the French TSO RTE.
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Technology Installed capacities Percentage of production
Nuclear 48 % 72 %
Coal 2 % 1 %
Gas and Fuel 8 % 4 %
Wind turbines and Photovoltaic 18 % 7 %
Hydropower 19 % 12 %
Bioenergy 6 % 4 %
Table 3: Different technologies and their weights. The first column lists the technologies
present in the French mix. The second column represents the percentages in terms of
installed capacities for each technology. The third column represents the percentages in
terms of energy produced.
The cost of construction per unit κ1 in [e/MWh] is taken as the equivalent annual cost of a gas turbine power plant
instead of a weighted average since only peak power plants are used for the control (construction or dismantling). The
equivalent annual cost of a gas turbine power plant with a total cost of investment CTotal cost = 550 [e/kW]– which should
not be confused with the levelized cost of energy, and is computed by dividing the annual cost of investment by the total
number of hours per year (8760 hours)– , a lifetime TGas Turbine = 30 [Years], and a discount rate r = 8% is computed as
κ1 = nrCTotal cost1−(1+r)TGas Turbine = 122.13 [e/kW], where n is the number of upcoming annuities approximated by n ' 2.5. A more
precise computation requires to take n as the number of annuities left to pay during the contract time (between 1 and 5 years),
but we chose to simplify and take an average value n = 2.5.
The adjustment coefficient κ2 is taken as κ2 = 2× κ1 where κ2 is in [e/(MWh×MW)]. Different sensitivities with respect to
this parameter are then performed and ensure that results are stable within a reasonable range of parameters.
A summary of our calibrated parameters for producer’s costs can be found in table 4.
Parameter Value Unit
Producer’s costs
κ1 122.13 [e/kW]
κ2 31.8× 10−4 [e/(MWh×MW)]
a 75.35 [e/(kW×year)]
b 17.6 [e/MWh]
Table 4: Calibrated parameters for construction, maintenance and production costs. κ1
and κ2 are set to the equivalent annual cost of a gas turbine, and a and b are weighted
averages (with weights from table 3) of the costs of maintenance and production of all
technologies.
3.1.4 Utility, disutility and risk aversion
Risk aversions and utility preferences, θ, k, ηA, ηP and the participation constraint R, are parameters less straightforward to
calibrate.
The participation constraint (or cash equivalent of the reservation utility) R is defined as a function of the solution
to producer’s problem in absence of capacity payment, and given by 2.39. R is computed by numerically solving the PDE (5.107).
The parameter θ is expressed in [e/MWh], and reflects consumers’ satisfaction in consumption per GW over time, or how
much they are willing to pay for the electricity. This parameter is calibrated as the Value of Lost Load (VoLL)6.
We assume that producer should be more risk averse than consumer. The reason of this assumption is that consumer’s risk
aversion embeds the aversion to shortage represented by the term in k. Roughly speaking, as soon as there is a shortage,
consumer’s utility starts to decrease because of the term ηP × k(XD −XC)+. We can interpret it by saying that consumer
is willing to accept more financial risk than producer, in exchange of offsetting the risk of having a shortage. We choose
therefore ηA > ηP and we take values inspired by the calibration in Aïd et al. (2016). A sensitivity analysis is then performed
6See again “Impact assessment of the French Capacity Market, 2018.” by RTE.
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on these parameters and we find that our results are not affected if producer is more risk averse than the consumer or the contrary.
Regarding the parameter k, we use a further constraint which is that the average number of shortage hours per year should
be reasonable. Indeed, recall that for most European electricity systems, the targeted maximum number of hours of shortage
(LoLE), is 3 hours Newbery (2016). Therefore we calibrate these parameters by an iterative procedure, i.e., by repeatedly
solving the problem, diffusing the state variables, computing the total period of shortage and adjusting the parameters until we
attain a reasonable number of shortage hours per year. A possible set of consumer’s preferences and risk aversions of both
parties is given in the table 5. Of course, one could always argue that this set of parameters is not unique because of the
degrees of liberties compared to the number of constraints, but this set seems quite reasonable and produces stable numerical
results, which we present in the next section along with a sensitivity analysis.
Parameter Value Unit
Consumer’s preferences θ 20000 [e/MWh]
k 200000 [e/MWh]
Risk aversions ηA 0.852× 10
−4 [Me]−1
ηP 0.8094× 10−5 [Me]−1
Participation constraint R 2.8 [e/MWh]
Table 5: Choice of risk aversions, and calibrated preferences. This table provides estimates
for risk aversions ηA and ηP , and consumers’ utility for consumption θ (the VoLL), together
with their aversion to shortage k, and the minimal payment required by producer R. This
set of parameters generates scenarios with a reasonable number of shortage hours.
3.2 Numerical results : Comparison between the system with and without a CRM
Once the parameters fixed, we simulate N = 5000 scenarios and compare three different cases; one “without a CRM”, where
producer adjusts capacities to maximize his utility, another “with a CRM”; using the optimal policy for both consumer
(optimal compensation (2.32)) and producer (recommended effort (2.25)), and a third one with no capacity adjustment (“No
adjustment”), i.e., no building or dismantling of capacities; leaving them subject to external uncertainties. Table 6 summarizes
the results of our simulations.
Without CRM With a CRM No adjustment
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Shortage hours per year [Hours] 6165.4 1459.1 2.2 7.4 178.4 594.3
Average Spot price [euro/MWh] 146.5 30 37.6 9.6 43 16.4
Average Margin [GW] -6 8.2 32.4 9.0 28.1 11.4
Spot revenues [euro/MWh] 134.6 25.6 37.8 9.6 43.1 16.2
Capacity payment [euro/MWh] NA NA 12.3 13.2 NA NA
Spot + Capacity payment[euro/MWh] 134.6 25.6 50.1 10.9 43.1 16.2
Participation constraint [euro/MWh] NA NA 2.8 0.0 NA NA
Risk shared [euro/MWh] NA NA -0.2 11.7 NA NA
Risk compensation [euro/MWh] NA NA 14.9 3.9 NA NA
Total costs [euro/MWh] 77.4 9.3 32.7 3.2 30.5 1.6
Construction and dismantling [euro/MWh] 50.3 9.7 1.8 3.7 0 0
Maintenance [euro/MWh] 9.5 0.7 13.2 1.3 12.9 1.6
Production [euro/MWh] 17.6 0 17.6 0.0 17.6 0
Table 6: Comparison between different policies. This table regroups the average and standard deviation
of the most relevant quantities over N = 5000 simulations. The first two columns represent the scenarios
generated without a CRM, i.e., where producer controls the capacity and his only income is the spot
revenue. The next two columns represent our proposed CRM, with scenarios generated following
the recommended effort and a capacity payment. The last columns provide the results for scenarios
generated without any control on capacity and without capacity payment.
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3.2.1 The system evolution without a capacity payment
We start by analyzing the system without a capacity payment. As mentioned before, the producer has market power and no
incentive to satisfy the LoLE constraint, since his goal is to maximize his utility function instead of just offsetting his marginal
costs. On the contrary, as his only compensation is from the spot market, his optimal strategy consists in finding the equilibrium
between high enough spot prices (corresponding to low or even negative capacity margins) and high enough available capacity
as spot compensation is
∫ T
0 P (Xt)X
C
t ∧XDt dt. We can see from table 6 that producer settles for a -6 GW average, which
corresponds to an average spot price of 146 euros/MWh. It follows from this negative equilibrium average margin that the
system is in shortage situation most of the period [0, T ], which is confirmed by the numerical results (6165 shortage hours per year).
In figure 3a, we can observe one scenario without a CRM. As stated before, producer’s optimal strategy is to decrease the
capacity level which leads to the spot prices increasing, see figure 3b. This decrease in capacity continues even after reaching
the average demand level (about 60 GW) and attains an equilibrium (around 20 GW in the scenario which is more severe than
average). This explains the high construction and dismantling costs mainly due to dismantling actions.
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(a) Capacity and demand without a CRM.
In red the demand with a constant average,
and in black the capacity generation decreas-
ing over time and suggesting consistent dis-
mantling of powerplants and an increasing
number of shortage hours per year.
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(b) Spot price without a CRM. The evolution
of spot price is the reverse of the margin
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Figure 3: Evolution over time of the state variables without a CRM. The capacity and demand (GW)
and the corresponding spot price (Euros/MWh), for a scenario where producer controls the generation
capacity, and his only income is the spot revenue.
The figures 3a and 3b illustrate that without a CRM, producer will be better off with low capacity and high spot revenues,
and therefore if we aim at keeping a reasonable level of available capacity (which implies lower spot prices), it is necessary to
provide him with a complementary compensation to replace his losses in spot revenues. We highlight the fact that the absence
of a capacity payment would have much less drastic impacts in the real life than what we observe in our numerical simulations.
This is due from one side to the regulation authorities which would not allow for such levels of shortage to occur, and from the
other side because of the presence of multiple producers in competition who might decide to invest more –breaking the market
power–, or even new actors (producers) willing to invest and enter the market in such favorable conditions (i.e., with a spot
price much higher than costs.)
The loss of spot revenues incurred by producer when keeping high capacity levels is partly captured by his participation
constraint, since R also accounts for the change in construction, maintenance and production costs. In fact, the more
profitable the system without a CRM to the producer, the higher R, and the more inciting the contract (CRM) needs
to be. In our setting R = 2.8e/MWh, and is decreasing in σC and increasing in σD. When the volatility of capacity is
high, the efforts of producer have less and less impact on XC -and therefore on the system- and his utility (or its cash
equivalent R) is lower. On the other side, whenever the volatility of demand is high, the probability of shortage increases
16
and when capacity margin becomes low this drives the spot prices up in an amplified manner which gives the producer more utility.
Similar to the volatility of capacity σC , the parameters κ2 and xC0 have the same impact on R; the cost of control (in this
case, the cost of shutting down powerplants) becomes higher with κ2 which lowers producer’s utility, while a positive change in
the initial value xC0 increases the capacity margin and decreases the spot prices and R as a result. Finally, and obviously,
higher spot prices (because of higher spot levels β0) increase R.
Note that it is not possible to infer from the first column of table 6 the participation constraint R = 2.8e/MWh, since the
utility function is concave we have R = U−1A (E [UA (Spot + Capacity payment− Total Costs)]) which is lower than what can
be read from the table and which corresponds to E [Spot] + E [Capacity payment]− E [Total Costs].
3.2.2 Analysis of the system evolution under the optimal policy
Coming back to table 6, we can see that introducing the CRM drastically improves the security of the system; (an average of 2
hours shortage per year–respecting the LoLE constraint– compared to 178 hours per year when there is no capacity adjustment
and 6165 hours per year when producer has market power.) Remark that this also reduces consumer’s payments: it is less
costly for the consumer to pay for capacity and the spot prices (which is in average rather low because the system margin is
high) than paying only the spot prices “without CRM” where spot prices are very high.
Observe also that when comparing the system with a CRM and without capacity adjustment, we see that the average
margin is positive in both cases and quite high (32 GW and 28 GW) so one would expect that these two settings would be quite
similar. However, we see that we obtain a substantial gain in the average number of shortage hours per year when following the
dictated policy (with 32 GW capacity margin), going from 178 hours per year to only 2 hours per year. This owes to the design
of the contract in the CRM taking into account the magnitude of uncertainties and other characteristics of the system.
In order to better interpret producer’s optimal policy, we select and analyze two of the 5000 simulated scenarios; a severe
scenario –the one with the highest number of shortage hours over the period of simulation, selected a posteriori– and a Favorable
scenario. Table 7 provides the outcomes of these scenarios compared with the average scenario.
Average scenario Favorable scenario Severe scenario
Shortage hours per year [Hours] 2.2 0.0 113.9
Average Spot price [euro/MWh] 37.6 31.9 59.4
Average Margin [GW] 32.4 36.0 17.3
Spot revenues [euro/MWh] 37.8 32.1 59.7
Capacity payment [euro/MWh] 12.3 57.9 21.7
Spot + Capacity payment[euro/MWh] 50.1 90.0 81.4
Participation constraint [euro/MWh] 2.8 2.7 2.7
Risk shared [euro/MWh] -0.2 43.4 -40.7
Risk compensation [euro/MWh] 14.9 12.7 52.1
Total costs [euro/MWh] 32.7 31.2 67.3
Construction and dismantling [euro/MWh] 1.8 0.0 38.6
Maintenance [euro/MWh] 13.2 13.6 11.1
Production [euro/MWh] 17.6 17.6 17.6
Table 7: Comparison between different scenarios with CRM. This table regroups the results of the
diffusion of N = 5000 scenarios with the CRM and following the recommended effort to assess the
extreme outcomes that might occur. The first column represents the average over all scenarios for
reference, the second column provides the results for one “favorable” scenario with 0 shortage hours,
and the third column provides the results of a “severe” scenario; the one with the maximal number of
shortage hours in our simulations.
We plot first the evolution of state variables in figure 4. We can see in red the evolution of demand, and in black the
available capacity. The demand process is by construction a mean-reverting process. However, the capacity is a geometric
Brownian motion. So the capacity has a priori no reason to exhibit a mean-reverting behavior which is nevertheless observed in
4 on the right figure (b). This mean-reversion can be explained by the effort rate αˆ which readjusts the capacity depending on
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the randomness, and the level of security fixed by consumers’ preferences. This readjustment can also be seen in the difference
between construction costs in table 7; the severe scenario having the highest cost suggesting a policy with intensive construction.
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Figure 4: Evolution of capacity and demand under the recommended effort αˆ. We compare the evolution
of state variables for the “favorable” and “severe” scenarios. In the favorable scenario (left), the capacity
(black) remains above the demand (red) with a high margin, as opposed to the severe scenario (right)
where capacity is drawn down from external uncertainties and goes beyond the demand process a few
times corresponding to the occurrences of shortage.
Figure 5 provides an interpretation of producer’s optimal control, by comparing two policies. In black, we see the capacity
evolution obtained with producer’s optimal policy, and in red the capacity without adjustment, i.e., αt = 0 for t ∈ [0, T ]. This
is interpreted as a comparison between our model and a the “No adjustment” policy model in which producer sets an initial
capacity margin (30 GW in this case) and the system is then only impacted by the uncertainties.
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Figure 5: Comparison between producer’s optimal policy (the recommended effort) and a “no adjustment”
policy for two different scenarios. The black line represents the controlled capacity for the favorable (left)
and severe (right) scenarios. The externalities in these scenarios are made explicit with the uncontrolled
capacity processes (red), and the impact of the control can be seen from the difference between the
black line and the red line. As expected, the favorable scenario has positive externalities and the control
is slightly negative, while the severe scenario has negative externalities and a positive control.
The figure shows that the Favorable scenario is a scenario where the capacities naturally experience favorable outcomes.
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For example, the inputs of hydro-powerplants, the load factor of wind and photovoltaic should have been very high, or no
major failure of power plant should have been observed. On the contrary, the severe scenario is a scenario where capacities
uncertainties are very unfavorable (strong drop of capacity after year 2, which can be seen in the “no capacity adjustment
policy”). We can see that optimal policy absorbs this shock, at least partially because of the costs of construction preventing
producer from restoring a higher capacity margin.
A heuristic observation of consumer’s value function suggests that whenever the capacity margin is tight (when xC − xD
is small), there is a high risk of shortage and a low satisfaction from consumption. We can guess then that ∂xCu  0 as
a higher capacity level will make consumer’s situation better. It makes sense then for consumer to recommend a positive
control αˆ as suggested from (2.34), which is confirmed numerically as αˆ takes higher values, and pushes the capacity process
up. This represents a typical situation where we can see the implicit dependence of αˆ on xD (in particular on xC − xD) as
mentioned in Remark 2.8 ((i) and (ii)). The same pattern is observed at year 2 and 2.5 in the severe scenario where the
producer invests to counteract a negative shock in capacity. However, between year 3 and 4.5, as it becomes very expensive
to keep a positive capacity margin, the optimal control does not follow the shock and a serie of shortages occurs. This
implies that starting from some threshold, consumers are willing to accept a shortage instead of paying a very high price to avoid it.
Finally, remark that from consumer’s perspective, the total payment (capacity remuneration + spot) is higher than average
in the extreme scenarios, whether favorable or severe. Indeed, when the scenario is severe, the spot prices are high, and the
capacity compensation is also high because of construction costs, and so consumer has to pay a lot for both. On the other hand,
when the scenario is favorable, the spot prices are low but the consumer still needs to incentivize the producer with a high
capacity compensation and share the positive risks (the “reward for good luck”).
3.3 Analysis of the optimal contract
3.3.1 Decomposition of capacity payment
To understand how the contract is designed, we use the decomposition (2.37) suggested in section 2.6, recalled below:
Capacity remuneration (ξ?) + Spot compensation = R+ Producer’s costs + Risk shared + Risk compensation. (2.37)
This decomposition is represented for the favorable and severe scenarios in figures 6a and 6b. In each of these figures, the
first bar represents the total compensation (the left hand side terms of equality (2.37)), and the second bar corresponds to the
right hand side. Remark that in the favorable scenario all the components are positive, and add up to the total compensation,
while in the severe scenario, there is a negative component which is the risk shared. Nevertheless in this case also the algebraic
sum of the components is equal to the total compensation.
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(a) Favorable scenario. The left bar aggregates the total
compensation : (spot revenues + capacity remuneration),
and is equal to the right bar (participation constraint
+ producer’s costs + risk shared + risk compensation)
where we can see that all these terms are positive for
the favorable scenario.
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(b) Severe scenario. The left bar is the sum (spot rev-
enues + capacity remuneration). The right bar has a
part above zero representing the sum (participation con-
straint + producer’s costs+risk compensation), and a
negative “risk shared” component because of the unfa-
vorable uncertainties.
Figure 6: Decomposition of ξ? for the favorable and severe scenarios highlighting the equality
(spot + capacity) = (participation constraint + producer’s costs + risk shared + risk compensation).
In the severe scenario –figure 6b– the realized randomness is very unprofitable to the system. Our contract automatically
shares this negative randomness with the producer (negative “risk shared”). On the contrary, in the favorable scenario –figure
6a– where capacity outcomes are naturally high and profitable, this positive randomness is also shared with the producer but
positively.
In addition, the contract accounts for the costs needed to implement the optimal policy, the remuneration from
spot and the risk compensation. Remark that, as expected, the risk compensation is positive in both cases, even
when the shared randomness is positive. This helps to offset the impact of the risk shared, for example in the severe
scenario the negative risk shared (-40 euros/MWh) is completely canceled by the risk compensation (52 euros/MWh), see Table 7.
In the severe scenario the compensation for costs (the difference between blue and green) is quite high (this is mainly linked
to the high costs needed to follow the optimal policy, consisting in investing a lot), whereas under the favorable scenario, this
part is much limited (investment to be made are small). However, the remuneration obtained from the spot market in the
favorable scenario (with a high capacity margin) is much less than in the severe scenario (with a low capacity margin). This
leads to a low capacity payment under the severe scenario compared to the favorable scenario.
3.3.2 Link between capacity payment and spot compensation
Table 8 provides another comparison between the system without a CRM, with a CRM and with no adjustment, but this time
with regard to the occurrences of missing money (when total costs are more than spot revenues) and the scenarios with negative
net revenues for producer, along with the role played by spot in total compensation in the case of a CRM, and the percentage
of scenarios with a negative capacity remuneration.
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Without CRM With a CRM No adjustment
Spot revenues/Total revenues [%] 100 70 100
Scenarios with missing money [%] 2 28 26
Scenarios with negative capacity remuneration [%] NA 18 NA
Scenarios with negative total compensation [%] NA 0 NA
Scenarios with negative net revenues [%] 2 5 26
Table 8: Comparison between policies outcomes for producer with and without CRM. Each column
of this table provides the average ratio (Spot revenues/Total revenues) on a sample of N = 5000
simulated scenarios, together with the percentages of scenarios with missing money (total costs>spot
revenues), the scenarios with (capacity remuneration<0) and the scenarios with (spot revenue+capacity
remuneration)<0, and those with negative net revenues (total compensation - total costs)<0. The
first column represents the scenarios without a CRM, where producer controls the capacity and his
only income is the spot revenue. The second column represents our CRM, with scenarios following
the recommended effort and a capacity payment. The third column provides the results for scenarios
generated without any control on capacity and without capacity payment.
Regarding the system with a CRM, we obtain an average number of shortage hours per year less than three hours, which
satisfies the LoLE constraint. The revenue provided by the capacity payment is about 30% of the total compensation (compared
to 70% for spot market).
In our simulations EPα
? [
ST+ξ?
ST
]
∈ [1.42, 1.43] with a 95% confidence level and a standard deviation of 0.53. This
corresponds roughly to a partition of total revenues into 70% from spot market and 30% from capacity compensation. However,
as we can see in figure 7, the distribution of ST+ξ
?
ST
can take values less than 1 (even negative theoretically, but not observed
in practice (cf. Table 8)) when ξ? is negative. Whenever they occur, the negative capacity prices could be interpreted as a
reimbursement from producers when their revenues from the spot market are high, similar to reliability options used in Italy
and Ireland, and which by definition require such a money transfer when the spot price exceeds a certain level Bhagwat &
Meeus (2019).
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Figure 7: Distribution of ST+ξ
?
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with a CRM. The ratio (total compensation/spot revenues) is observed
on N = 5000 scenarios, with an average of 1.42, and a positive probability (0.18) of being lower than 1,
i.e., of having (total compensation < spot revenues).
We investigate more this ratio in figure 8 by decomposing the total compensation into spot revenues and capacity remuneration
for the favorable and severe scenarios, together with another extreme scenario.
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(a) Favorable scenario. This scenario corresponds
to high capacity levels, with low spot prices, so the
capacity remuneration revenues have the biggest
share in the total compensation.
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(b) Severe scenario. This scenario is characterized
by low capacities, and tight generation margins,
which increase the spot revenues, whereas the
capacity remuneration is low because of the (neg-
ative) risk shared.
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(c) Scenario with the lowest ST+ξ
?
ST
ratio. This particular
extreme scenario shows the “punishement for bad luck”
where the capacity remuneration is negative (because of
the risk shared term), which considerably decreases the
total compensation compared to the spot compensation.
Figure 8: Decomposition of ξ? in terms of spot and capacity payment for different scenarios. In the three
figures, the left bar represents the total compensation, and the right bar represents the decomposition
total compensation = (spot compensation + capacity remuneration).
In the favorable scenario previously analyzed, figure 8a shows that the capacity payment is going to be more active than
in the severe scenario 8b to complement spot remuneration. For the favorable scenario, the capacity payment represents
64% of the total remuneration of the producers, compared to 27% in the severe scenario. This is explained by the capacity
margin, which dictates the level of spot prices and the need for a complementary compensation. Figure 8c illustrates a scenario
where the capacity margin is very little during all the period leading to high spot prices, accompanied by a negative capacity
remuneration.
Observe finally that the probability of getting negative net revenues drops from 26% in the case of no adjustment (very
uncertain for producer) to 5% in the case with a CRM. It remains howerver slightly more than in the case without a CRM (2%)
which is natural since in this scenario the producer’s only goal is to maximize his utility.
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3.3.3 When is there missing money or a negative capacity payment
We investigate in this section “unfavorable” scenarios. Over the 5000 scenarios simulated earlier with a CRM, we select the
ones where there is a missing money (MM) (where the spot remuneration is less than producer’s total costs (28% of scenarios)),
and the scenarios where the capacity remuneration is negative (NCR); (18% of scenarios), and the ones where there is a missing
money and the capacity remuneration is negative (MM and NCR); (1% of scenarios).
MM NCR MM and NCR
Percentage [%] 28 18 1
Table 9: Missing money and negative capacity payment with a CRM. This table focuses on our model
for CRM, and presents the percentages of “pathological” scenarios over N = 5000; the scenarios with
missing money (spot compensation < total costs), those with a negative capacity remuneration, and
those with both missing money and negative capacity remuneration.
We compute the same indicators as before for two groups of the selected scenarios (the ones with missing money “MM” and
the ones with a negative capacity remuneration “NCR”), and we discard the third group (with both “MM and NCR”) since
it concerns only 1% of the scenarios (average quantities are indeed meaningless in that case as the number of scenarios are
very low). We summarize the results in table 10. Note that these indicators are computed with a Monte-Carlo method using
different sizes of samples, and so do not have the same accuracy because of the different confidence intervals.
Reference MM NCR
mean sd mean sd mean sd
Shortage hours per year [Hours] 2.2 7.4 0.4 5.1 3.5 8.7
Average Spot price [euro/MWh] 37.6 9.6 25.8 4.9 44.6 6.5
Average Margin [GW] 32.4 9.0 43.9 6.9 26.2 4.7
Spot revenues [euro/MWh] 37.8 9.6 26.0 4.9 44.8 6.5
Capacity payment [euro/MWh] 12.3 13.2 22.7 11.6 -6.4 5.3
Spot + Capacity payment[euro/MWh] 50.1 10.9 48.7 10.4 38.4 7.7
Participation constraint [euro/MWh] 2.8 0.0 2.8 0.0 2.8 0.0
Risk shared [euro/MWh] -0.2 11.7 0.1 11.2 -14.6 8.2
Risk compensation [euro/MWh] 14.9 3.9 13.1 2.8 16.7 4.7
Total costs [euro/MWh] 32.7 3.2 32.8 2.7 33.5 4.1
Construction and dismantling [euro/MWh] 1.8 3.7 0.3 2.8 3.5 4.5
Maintenance [euro/MWh] 13.2 1.3 14.9 1.0 12.4 0.7
Production [euro/MWh] 17.6 0.0 17.6 0.0 17.6 0.0
Table 10: Missing money and negative capacity remuneration with a CRM. This table regroups the
average and sd of the relevant quantities for a simulation of N = 5000 scenarios with the recommended
policy. The first two columns provide the averages and sds over all the scenarios for reference. The
second two columns provide the average and sd of the same quantites but only on the scenarios with
missing money (spot revenues<total costs), and the last two columns provide the averages and sds over
the scenarios where the capacity payment is negative.
The major effect which explains missing money and negative capacity remuneration is the margin of the system. Missing
money often comes with high margin while a negative capacity remuneration happens mostly with a low margin.
A close look at table 10 shows that there is missing money whenever the average margin is high (43 GW) in average,
and so spot revenues are low (26 euros/MWh), and are not enough to cover total costs especially since maintenance
costs are higher than average (14.9 euros/MWh compared to 13.2 euros/MWh) which overrules the fact that construction
costs are close to zero. The CRM completes producer’s earnings on spot market since it compensates him systemati-
cally for his costs (whether high or low), and this can be seen in table 10 by the fact that average total compensation is above costs.
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The scenarios with negative capacity remuneration are more subtle to understand. In fact, they occur because our CRM is
designed to take into account the spot compensation and complement it only when needed. In other words, if we recall again
the decomposition of total compensation (2.37):
Capacity remuneration + Spot compensation = R+ Producer’s costs + Risk shared + Risk compensation, (2.37)
we can see that negative capacity remuneration is equivalent to
Spot compensation > R+ Producer’s costs + Risk shared + Risk compensation. (3.1)
This happens whenever the risk shared is negative (as confirmed by table 10 : -14.6 euros/MWh), suggesting unfavorable
uncertainties and low capacity margins (26 GW compared to 32 GW in average), which increases spot revenues (44.8 euros/MWh)
and consolidates the inequality (3.1). A typical scenario with a negative capacity remuneration would be one with a consistent
low demand and high capacity without much realized volatility. This would keep the risk compensation low, with negative risk
shared and high spot compensation. Nevertheless, observe that even in such conditions (unfavorable uncertainties), producer
manages to keep an acceptable number of shortage hours per year (3.5 hours per year).
3.4 The optimal capacity payment in other setups
We test our system under different conditions, in the case where there are more renewable energies; and thus more uncertainties
in the system (associated with higher σC (50% higher)), or when there is a demand response program applied on consumers,
i.e., assuming demand volatility σD is lower (50% lower).
We also test different risk aversions; with more risk averse consumers or more risk averse producers (multiplying by 10 the risk
aversion parameter each time).
3.4.1 More renewable energies or a demand response program (σC and σD)
A brief summary of the numerical results with perturbations of volatilites can be found in table 11.
Reference More renewables Demand response program
Spot revenues/Total revenues [%] 70 41 98
Scenarios with missing money [%] 28 74 25
Scenarios with negative capacity remuneration [%] 18 0 60
Scenarios with negative total compensation [%] 0 0 0
Scenarios with negative net revenues [%] 5 0 13
Table 11: Impacts of a shock in volatility on the CRM. This table presents the variation of total
compensation composition and the percentages of scenarios with missing money, negative capacity
remuneration, negative total compensation and negative net revenues. The first column recalls the
reference results with our calibrated parameters. The second column provides the results when the
volatility of capacity is 50% higher, interpreted as an increase of the proportion of renewable energies
(which are more variable). The third column provides the results when the volatility of demand is 50%
lower, interpreted as the introduction of some demand-response program driving consumers to have less
variable demand.
We can see that introducing more renewable energies in the system yields a higher percentage of scenarios with missing
money (74% as opposed to 28%), and to positive net revenues all the time. In this context, the capacity compensation is never
negative (in the observed scenarios), and plays a much more important role in complementing producer revenues (59% of total
revenues instead of only 30%). This is similar to what we observed in section 3.3.2, when comparing a severe and favorable
scenario.
By looking further into table 12, we can explain the missing money by the high costs of construction and dismantling (7.6
euros/MWh compared to 1.8 euros/MWh), and the role of capacity payment by the considerable amount of risk compensation
(34.5 euros/MWh compared to 14.9 euros/MWh).
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So in summary the more uncertainties in production, the more the need for a capacity mechanism in order to cope with the
random electricity demand and the random available capacity, since otherwise the number of shortage hours would increase.
The capacity mechanism results in increasing the capacity margin of the system. As the system is longer in terms of capacity,
spot prices are lower. Therefore, in average, consumers have to pay a higher capacity remuneration when the capacity volatility
increases, and producers receive a higher total compensation, and higher earnings even though the spot compensation decreases.
Reference More renewables Demand response program
Shortage hours per year [Hours] 2.2 2.8 0.7
Average Spot price [euro/MWh] 37.6 32.5 40.9
Average Margin [GW] 32.4 39.1 29.9
Spot revenues [euro/MWh] 37.8 32.6 40.7
Capacity payment [euro/MWh] 12.3 41.0 -3.2
Spot + Capacity payment[euro/MWh] 50.1 73.6 37.4
Participation constraint [euro/MWh] 2.8 0.0 2.2
Risk shared [euro/MWh] -0.2 -0.4 -0.1
Risk compensation [euro/MWh] 14.9 34.5 4.0
Total costs [euro/MWh] 32.7 39.4 31.3
Construction and dismantling [euro/MWh] 1.8 7.6 0.8
Maintenance [euro/MWh] 13.2 14.2 12.9
Production [euro/MWh] 17.6 17.6 17.6
Table 12: Impacts of a shock in volatility on the number of shortage hours, and the costs and revenues
of the CRM. The first column recalls the reference results with our calibrated parameters. The second
column provides the results when the volatility of capacity is 50% higher, interpreted as an increase of
the proportion of renewable energies (which are more variable). The third column provides the results
when the volatility of demand is 50% lower, interpreted as the introduction of some demand-response
incentive driving consumers to have less variable demand.
The third column of tables 11 and 12 summarizes numerical results when the demand volatility is lower, which is a model
for a demand response program; i.e., we assume that consumer is somehow incentivized to behave in a more predictable manner,
so that the uncertainty on demand fluctuations (σD) is lower.
In this case, the security of the system can be ensured with a lower capacity margin (29.9 GW instead of 32.4 GW) since
there are less uncertainties. Therefore the average spot price and the spot revenues are higher (40.9 euros/MWh instead of 37.6
euros/MWh), so we are likely to obtain the inequality (3.1) which we recall
Spot compensation > R+ Producer’s costs + Risk shared + Risk compensation, (3.1)
which is equivalent to having a negative capacity remuneration especially since none of the terms on the right hand side should
be high. This explains the high percentage of scenarios with negative capacity remuneration (60%).
These conditions suggest an auto-regulated market and less need for a CRM, since spot revenues represent 98% of total
compensation, even though there is missing money 25% percent of the time, and often a negative capacity remuneration (60%
of the time). We can guess that taking away the capacity remuneration would lead to an equilibrium situation with more
uncertainties for producer: he incurs losses when there is a missing money, but these losses are balanced by the scenarios where
the spot price is high, and he does not have to “pay” for capacity remuneration which is now a cost for him rather than a
revenue, making his net revenues negative in 13% of the scenarios. Nevertheless, the total remuneration of producer (spot +
capacity payment) is still above in average the total costs: in average with the CRM, the producer is going to earn money.
3.4.2 More risk aversion producer or consumer (ηA and ηP )
We analyze the impacts of the CRM when producer or consumer is more risk averse. The numerical results are summarized in
tables 13 and 14.
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Reference Risk averse producer Risk averse consumer
Shortage hours per year [Hours] 2.2 0.8 0.5
Average Spot price [euro/MWh] 37.6 32.8 34.4
Average Margin [GW] 32.4 36.6 34.9
Spot revenues [euro/MWh] 37.8 33.0 34.6
Capacity payment [euro/MWh] 12.3 51.2 380.6
Spot + Capacity payment[euro/MWh] 50.1 84.2 415.3
Participation constraint [euro/MWh] 2.8 0.0 2.7
Risk shared [euro/MWh] -0.2 -0.1 -0.3
Risk compensation [euro/MWh] 14.9 49.7 378.7
Total costs [euro/MWh] 32.7 34.6 34.1
Construction and dismantling [euro/MWh] 1.8 3.2 2.9
Maintenance [euro/MWh] 13.2 13.8 13.6
Production [euro/MWh] 17.6 17.6 17.6
Table 13: Impacts of a shock in risk aversion parameters on the number of shortage hours, and the costs
and revenues of the CRM. The first column recalls the reference results with our calibrated parameters.
The second column provides the results when producer’s risk aversion is higher (10× ηA). The third
column provides the results when consumer’s risk aversion is higher (10× ηP ).
The first observation is that a more risk averse producer has a zero participation constraint, which means that the utility
gained from a system without a CRM is negative.
Apart from this observation, we have in both cases the same impacts but with different magnitudes. We can see that the
costs of construction are slightly higher, with lower spot revenues. This leads to an increase in occurrences of missing money
scenarios, and a larger part of total revenues coming from capacity compensation (always positive, and representing 41% and
92% from total compared to 30%). This capacity compensation comes mainly from the risk compensation (51.2 euros/MWh
and 380 euros/MWh compared to 15 euros/MWh in the reference case).
Reference Risk averse producer Risk averse consumer
Spot revenues/Total revenues [%] 70 39 8
Scenarios with missing money [%] 28 53 41
Scenarios with negative capacity remuneration [%] 18 0 0
Scenarios with negative total compensation [%] 0 0 0
Scenarios with negative net revenues [%] 5 0 0
Table 14: Impacts of a shock in risk aversion parameters on the CRM. This table presents the variation
of total compensation composition and the percentages of scenarios with missing money, negative
capacity remuneration, negative total compensation and negative net revenues. The first column recalls
the reference results with our calibrated parameters. The second column provides the results when
producer’s risk aversion is higher (10× ηA). The third column provides the results when consumer’s
risk aversion is higher (10× ηP ).
To summarize, whenever one of the two parties is more risk averse, it becomes very costly for consumer to pay for capacity
remuneration. A risk averse producer would require more risk compensation (the risk compensation is proportional to producer’s
risk aversion by definition). From the other hand, a risk averse consumer would be ready to spend a lot to avoid potential
shortage or blackout. The consequence is that the producer gets positive total compensation and positive net revenues 100% of
the time.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide some insights on how electricity producers and consumers could share the financial and physical risks
(and uncertainties) to ensure the security of the system. We propose a CRM based on contract theory, which incentivizes
producers to perform an optimal level of effort to maintain and develop new power-plants. It takes the form of a contract and a
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recommended effort, with payment adjusted to the uncertainty of outcomes (weather, outages...) ensuring to producers the right
level of average earnings and financial risks while accounting for the spot revenues, as long as they follow the recommended effort.
This means that the CRM does not disrupt the spot market operations, which remains therefore able to ensure the short-term
optimal economical dispatch. Given a predefined level of security for the system, the capacity mechanism we propose pro-
vides the right level of investment needed to insure it, and gives us insights to challenge real implementations of capacity markets.
One of our main results is that we point out the necessity of a CRM. This is reinforced with the level of randomness of the
capacity and demand. Higher share of random renewable production in the electrical system means that a higher fraction of
the compensation of the producers needs to come from a capacity remuneration system. As a matter of fact, in that case
the volume of installed capacities should be more important to ensure the security of the system. Meanwhile, the spot price
decreases (the spot price is decreasing with respect to installed capacities, which is consistent with the increase of the supply
curve), and so it is essential to support installed capacities.
In the meantime, the higher the volatility of consumption or supply, the higher the volatility of the capacity market. The
mechanism we proposed also enables to study how risks should be share between the producers and the consumers. The increase
of the financial risk is principally supported by the producers who are then compensated by a higher average revenue. However,
even when there is a capacity payment, the number of hours of shortage increases when consumption or production become more
volatile. In fact, if consumers do not modify the virtual value they associate to shortage, it is economically optimal for them to
accept more hours of shortage instead of increasing suppliers’ compensation. The capacity payment enables to share the financial
risk between the producers and consumers depending on their risk aversion. The producers accept to take more financial risk if
it comes with an increase of their average revenue. This is also what happens when the consumers want to reduce the physical risk.
Finally, we propose some variants for further research. It would be interesting to challenge our results by using other spot
functions, especially ones that could reach higher peaks than the function (2.11). Furthermore, we assumed that the demand
process is completely exogenous and uncontrolled. We explored this aspect of the model to a certain extent in section 3.4 by
studying the sensitivities of our results with respect to the volatility of demand. Adding a direct control on the demand process
would be relevant but would also change drastically the resolution methodology and is therefore an open research question. The
same can be said about the assumption that dismantling power plants has the same cost as building new ones.
In addition, representing several technologies to produce electricity would also make a lot of sense. This could be the starting
point for a future work by considering for example the possibility to control the volatility of the capacity process or to have
several producers with different technologies instead of one. We also used a continuous time setting, which is convenient for
modeling and computations, but requires using small time steps to discretize and approximate the optimal control (in our
simulations we used a daily time step). This is equivalent to ignoring the delay needed to build new power plants which is not
completely realistic, but remains quite common in such models because decision-making delay is hard to capture. Finally, our
model only represents one design of CRM (a kind of sophisticated capacity payment). Further work may include other possible
market designs.
5 Appendix
5.1 Mathematical framework and weak formulation
This section is devoted to the mathematical formulation of the problem. For T ∈ (0, +∞) a fixed maturity, we denote
by Ω := C
(
[0, T ] ,R2
)
the space of continuous functions from [0, T ] to R2. The system is described by the state variable
X :=
(
XC , XD
)T which is the canonical process on Ω. Finally we endow Ω with its Borel σ-algebra FT and define the
completed filtration F generated by the process X.
We define the reference probability measure as the weak solution of the controlled equation (2.5) with a constant control
set to zero, i.e., αt = 0 for t ∈ [0, T ], on the space (Ω,FT ) and we denote it P0. It is characterized as the unique probability
measure such that P0 ◦ (X0)−1 = δx0 for some x0 ∈ R2+ and the processes
(
Xt −
∫ t
0 µ (Xs, 0) ds
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a
(
P0,F
)
–martingale
with 〈X〉t =
∫ t
0 σ (Xs)σ
ᵀ (Xs) ds for t ∈ [0, T ]. Note that existence and uniqueness of this measure are insured by the existence
of a unique strong solution to the corresponding SDE. Therefore there exists a 2–dimensional P0–Brownian motion W P0 such
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that
Xt = X0 +
∫ t
0
µ (Xs, 0) ds+
∫ t
0
σ (Xs) dW P
0
s , for t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.1)
Notice that under P0 the component XC is a martingale (the drift part of XC is zero when the control is constantly equal to 0).
Definition 5.1 (Admissible controls). Recall from section 2.2 that U is the set of F–predictable processes valued in [αmin, αmax].
For α ∈ U , the Novikov’s criterion is satisfied (from the boundedness of α):
EP
0
[
e
1
2
∫ T
0
(
αt
σC
)2
dt
]
< +∞, (5.2)
and so the process
E
(∫ t
0
αs
σC
dWC,P
0
s
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a
(
P0,F
)
-UI martingale, (5.3)
and we can define the induced probability measure Pα on (Ω,FT ) as the equivalent measure to P0 with its Radon–Nikodym
derivative dP
α
dP0 := E
(∫ T
0
αs
σC
dWC,P
0
s
)
,
Lαt := dP
α
dP0
∣∣
Ft
,
(5.4)
where WC,P0 is the capacity component of the Brownian motion. We denote by P the collection of probability measures Pα
induced by the set of controls α ∈ U .
By applying Girsanov’s theorem, we can see that for an admissible control α, the process X has the law of SDE (2.5) under Pα.
Remark that the demand component is not affected by this change of probability, i.e., P0 ◦
(
XD
)−1 = Pα ◦ (XD)−1, for every
admissible α, which is consistent with our model: the control is only on (the drift) of the capacity.
Definition 5.2. The set Ξ of admissible contracts is defined as the collection of FT –measurable random variables ξ satisfying
V A0 (ξ) ≥ UA (R) ,
P? (ξ) 6= ∅,
sup
Pα∈P
EP
α [
e(ηA∨ηP )(1+δ)|ξ|
]
<∞, for some δ > 0.
(5.5)
The definition of admissible contracts imposes the existence of an optimal control for agent which satisfies the participation
constraint, and non-degeneracy conditions for both principal and agent problems.
5.2 Definition and derivation of the class of revealing contracts Z
5.2.1 Definition
Let V be the set of F-predictable processes Z valued in R2 satisfyingE
Pα
[
E
(
−ηA
∫ T
0 Zt · σ (Xt) dWαt
)]
= 1, for Pα ∈ P,
sup
Pα∈P
EP
α
[
e(ηA∨ηP )(1+δ)|Y 0,ZT |
]
<∞, (5.6)
where we recall
Y Y0,Zt = Y0 +
∫ t
0
Zs · dXs −
∫ t
0
H (Xs, Zs) ds, for t ∈ [0, T ] , (2.22)
and H defined as in (2.23). The class of revealing contracts Z is then the subset of Ξ containing the terminal values of(
Y Y0,Zt
)
t∈[0,T ] parameterized by the two control variables (Y0, Z) ∈ (R× V);
Z =
{
Y Y0,ZT for some (Y0, Z) ∈ R× V with Y Y0,ZT ∈ Ξ
}
. (2.21)
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5.2.2 Derivation of the class Z
The aim of this subsection is to explain the intuition behind the class of revealing contracts Z in the spirit of Sannikov (2008),
which is a key ingredient in the resolution of our problem. Rather than providing a rigorous treatment of this question (for
which we refer the reader to Cvitanić et al. (2018)), we only present here the main ideas behind it.
The main goal of introducing the class Z which–we recall–plays the role of a performance index, is to overcome the
non-markovianity of the principal-agent problem, and to make agent’s response “predictable” by principal. This is achieved by
the martingale optimality principle.
We start by recalling agent’s value function:
V A0 (ξ) = sup
Pα∈P
EP
α
[
UA
(
ξ +
∫ T
0
s(Xt)dt−
∫ T
0
cA (Xt, αt) dt
)]
. (5.7)
We first restrict the contracts to the ones which are terminal values of some diffusion process, i.e., of the form ξ = Y Y0,ZT where
Y0 and Z are new control variables, and Y Y0,ZT = Y0 +
∫ T
0 Zt · dXt +
∫ T
0 g (t,Xt, Yt, Zt) dt, where g is a deterministic function
to be determined.
Roughly speaking, this allows us to reduce to the markovian case by recapturing principal’s “missing” information and
plugging it into the new process Y Y0,ZT . This is done through the change of control variables from ξ to Y0 and Z. We stress
here that this not a mathematical proof but just an explanation, since Y Y0,ZT is a solution to some SDE and has a priori no
reason to exist (so far we didn’t impose any restrictions on the function g).
Now that we are in a markovian setting, we want to get rid of the moral-hazard, i.e., to have a predicable response from the
agent. This is possible by a careful choice of the function g. In fact, by the structure of the exponential utility UA(x) = −e−ηAx,
we have by a simple application of Itô formula that the process defined by UA
(
Y Y0,Zt +
∫ t
0
(
s(Xr)− cA(Xr, αr)
)
dr
)
t∈[0,T ]
,
will be a (Pα,F)-supermartingale and a martingale only for some αˆ if we choose g such that
g (t, x, y, z) = −H (x, z) for (t, x, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]× R2+ × R× R2, (5.8)
with H the hamiltonian defined in (2.23). This gives us first an upper bound on agent’s optimal control V A0
(
Y Y0,ZT
)
≤ UA (Y0)
by the supermartingale property, and we have that this bound is attained for the control induced by Pαˆ by construction.
Therefore, since agent is rational and aims at maximizing his utility, he chooses the control αˆ, which is a deterministic
function of the pair (Xt, Zt)t∈[0,T ], both observable by principal.
5.3 Solving Producer’s problem: proof of Proposition 2.5
Let Y Y0,ZT ∈ Z and Pα ∈ P. By definition
JA0
(
Y Y0,ZT ,P
α
)
= EP
α
[
UA
(
Y Y0,ZT +
∫ T
0
(
s(Xt)− cA(Xt, αt)
)
dt
)]
,
= EP
α
[
UA
(
Y0 +
∫ T
0
Zt · dXt −
∫ T
0
H (Xt, Zt) dt+
∫ T
0
(
s(Xt)− cA(Xt, αt)
)
dt
)]
.
(5.9)
Using (2.24) :∫ T
0
Zs · dXs =
∫ T
0
h (Xt, Zt, αt) dt+
∫ T
0
σ (Xt)Zt · dWαt −
∫ T
0
(
s(Xt)− cA (Xt, αt)
)
dt+ ηA2
∫ T
0
|σ (Xt)Zt|2dt, (5.10)
and therefore replacing UA with its expression and injecting (5.10) we get
JA0
(
Y Y0,ZT ,P
α
)
= EP
α
[
−e−ηA
(
Y0+
∫ T
0
h(Xt,Zt,αt)−H(Xt,Zt)dt+
∫ T
0
σ(Xt)Zt·dWαt +
ηA
2
∫ T
0
|σ(Xt)Zt|2dt
)]
= UA (Y0)EP
α
[
e
ηA
∫ T
0
{H(Xt,Zt)−h(Xt,Zt,αt)}dtE
(
−ηA
∫ T
0
Zt · σ (Xt) dWαt
)]
.
(5.11)
Since Z ∈ V we have that
EP
α
[
E
(
−ηA
∫ T
0
Zt · σ (Xt) dWαt
)]
= 1, (5.12)
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and we can define the probability measure P˜α equivalent to Pα with the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dP˜α
dPα := E
(
−ηA
∫ T
0
Zt · σ (Xt) dWαt
)
, (5.13)
and so
JA0
(
Y Y0,ZT ,P
α
)
= UA (Y0)EP˜
α
[
e
ηA
∫ T
0
{H(Xt,Zt)−h(Xt,Zt,αt)}dt
]
. (5.14)
Recalling that UA (Y0) < 0, and H (Xt, Zt)− h (Xt, Zt, αt) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if αt = αˆ
(
XCt , Z
C
t
)
for all t in [0, T ],
we obtain the upper bound
JA0
(
Y Y0,ZT ,P
α
)
≤ UA (Y0) for all Pα ∈ P, (5.15)
which is attained for
(
αˆ
(
XCt , Z
C
t
))
t∈[0,T ] since it is an admissible control (as it is a progressively measurable process valued in
[αmin, αmax]) and so
JA0
(
Y Y0,ZT ,P
αˆ
)
= UA (Y0) , (5.16)
which yields
V A0
(
Y Y0,ZT
)
= UA (Y0) , (5.17)
and
(
αˆ
(
XCt , Z
C
t
))
t∈[0,T ] is producer’s optimal response given the contract Y
Y0,Z
T .
5.4 Proof of Proposition 2.6
For readers familiar with BSDE theory, Proposition 2.6 can be seen as an existence result for BSDEs with a quadratic generator.
The following proof is largely inspired by Elie & Possamaï (2019) and El Euch et al. (2018), is classical in the non-Markovian
stochastic control theory and relies on the Agent’s continuation utility as a natural candidate for the solution of the BSDE.
We start by defining Agent’s continuation utility, and prove that it satisfies the Dynamic Programming Principle. Then we
use the assumptions on the set of admissible contracts and the properties of Agent’s continuation utility to conclude the proof
of Proposition 2.6.
Definition 5.3. Let τ be a stopping time valued in [t, T ]. We denote by Uτ the restriction of (Agent’s) controls to [τ, T ].We
define the dynamic version of Agent’s objective function for a given ξ ∈ Ξ as
JAτ (ξ,Pα) := EP
α
τ
[
UA
(
ξ +
∫ T
τ
s(Xr)dr −
∫ T
τ
cA (Xr, αr) dr
)]
and J Aτ (ξ) :=
(
JAτ (ξ,Pα)
)
α∈Uτ
, (5.18)
and his continuation utility
V Aτ (ξ) := ess sup
α∈Uτ
JAτ (ξ,Pα) . (5.19)
Remark that for any Pα ∈ P, the conditional expectation EPατ depends only on the restriction of α on [τ, T ]. It is then
defined without ambiguity for α ∈ Uτ .
Lemma 5.4. For ξ ∈ Ξ, t ∈ [0, T ], and τ an F-stopping time in [t, T ], we have that
(i) The family J Aτ (ξ) satisfies the lattice property, therefore the limiting sequence approaching V Aτ (ξ) can be chosen to be
non-decreasing, i.e., there exists a sequence of
(
Pα
n)
n≥0 such that
V Aτ (ξ) = lim
n→+∞
↑ JAτ
(
ξ,Pα
n
)
. (5.20)
(ii) The dynamic programming principle for Agent’s value function holds, i.e. for τ1 and τ2 two stopping times such that
0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T :
V Aτ1 (ξ) = ess sup
Pα∈P
EP
α
τ1
[
V Aτ2 (ξ) e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xt,αt)−s(Xt))dt
]
. (5.21)
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Proof. (i) We consider two controls α and α′ in Uτ . We define then
α˜ := α1{JAτ (ξ,Pα)≥JAτ (ξ,Pα′)} + α
′
1{JAτ (ξ,Pα)<JAτ (ξ,Pα′)} (5.22)
Then α˜ ∈ Uτ and from the definition of α˜ we have the inequality
JAτ
(
ξ,Pα˜
)
≥ max
(
JAτ (ξ,Pα) , JAτ (ξ,Pα
′
)
)
, (5.23)
which proves the lattice property, implying (i) (Neveu 1972, Proposition VI.I.I, p121).
(ii) The proof of this part is similar to the one in (Cvitanić & Karatzas 1993, Proposition 6.2). We proceed in two steps proving
each of the two inequalities. The first inequality is a direct consequence of the tower property. In fact, for 0 ≤ τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T , we
have by definition
V Aτ1 (ξ) = ess sup
α∈Uτ1
EP
α
τ1
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ1 (cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr)
 ,
= ess sup
α∈Uτ1
EP
α
τ1
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ τ2τ1 (cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr)
 .
(5.24)
By the tower property of the expectation we write
V Aτ1 (ξ) = ess sup
α∈Uτ1
EP
α
τ1
eηA ∫ τ2τ1 (cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))drEPατ2
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr)
 . (5.25)
Using Bayes rule and remarking that EPατ2
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr)
 depends only on values of α after τ2, we have
that for an arbitrary α ∈ U
EP
α
τ2
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr)
 ≤ ess sup
α∈U
EP
α
τ2
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
τ2
(
cA(Xr, αr)− s(Xr)
)
dr
)]
,
= ess sup
α∈Uτ2
EP
α
τ2
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
τ2
(
cA(Xr, αr)− s(Xr)
)
dr
)]
,
= V Aτ2 (ξ) ,
(5.26)
and then
V Aτ1 (ξ) ≤ ess sup
Pα∈P
EP
α
τ1
[
V Aτ2 (ξ) e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
]
. (5.27)
We proceed next to prove the second inequality. Consider α ∈ U and ν ∈ Uτ2 . Define then the concatenation of the two controls
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T as (α⊗τ2 ν)t := αt10≤t<τ2 + νt1τ2≤t≤T , where τ2 is an F–stopping time.
We have then (α⊗τ2 ν) ∈ U and by definition of the essential supremum (where we denote Eα⊗τ2ντ1 instead of EP
α⊗τ2ν
τ1 ):
V Aτ1 (ξ) ≥ E
α⊗τ2ν
τ1
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ1(cA(Xr,(α⊗τ2ν)r)−s(Xr))dr)
 ,
= Eα⊗τ2ντ1
−e−ηA(−∫ τ2τ1 (cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,νr)−s(Xr))dr)e−ηAξ
 ,
= Eα⊗τ2ντ1
eηA ∫ τ2τ1 (cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))drEα⊗τ2ντ2
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,νr)−s(Xr))dr)
 .
(5.28)
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Using again Bayes formula on the conditional expectation w.r.t Fτ2 , we have that
Eα⊗τ2ντ2
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,νr)−s(Xr))dr)
 = E0τ2
−Lα⊗τ2νT
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
e
−ηA
(
ξ−
∫ T
τ2
(cA(Xr,νr)−s(Xr))dr
) . (5.29)
Now notice that L
α⊗τ2ν
T
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
= L
ν
T
Lντ2
(as stated earlier the change of measure applied to the conditional expectation depends only on
the control after τ2). We have therefore
Eα⊗τ2ντ2
−e−ηA(ξ−∫ Tτ2(cA(Xr,νr)−s(Xr))dr)
 = E0τ2
− LνT
Lντ2
e
−ηA
(
ξ−
∫ T
τ2
(cA(Xr,νr)−s(Xr))dr
) ,
= JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν) .
(5.30)
Thus we obtain the following inequality
V Aτ1 (ξ) ≥ E
α⊗τ2ν
τ1
[
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν)
]
. (5.31)
We use again Bayes Formula for the change of measure and the tower property of conditional expectation leading to
V Aτ1 (ξ) ≥ E0τ1
[
L
α⊗τ2ν
T
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ1
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν)
]
,
= E0τ1
[
E0τ2
[
L
α⊗τ2ν
T
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ1
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν)
]]
,
= E0τ1
[
E0τ2
[
L
α⊗τ2ν
T
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
]
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ1
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν)
]
,
= E0τ1
[
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ1
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν)
]
.
(5.32)
Now recall that for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ2 we have by definition (α⊗τ2 ν)t = αt, and therefore
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ2
L
α⊗τ2ν
τ1
= L
α
τ2
Lατ1
leading to
V Aτ1 (ξ) ≥ E0τ1
[
Lατ2
Lατ1
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν)
]
,
= Eατ1
[
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2 (ξ,P
ν)
]
. (5.33)
The inequality (5.33) holds for α ∈ U and ν ∈ Uτ2 , we can then by virtue of (i) choose a sequence (νn)n∈N of controls in Uτ2
such that
V Aτ2 (ξ) = lim
n→+∞
↑ JAτ2
(
ξ,Pν
n
)
, (5.34)
then we have by the monotone convergence theorem that for α ∈ U
V Aτ1 (ξ) ≥ lim
n→+∞
↑ Eατ1
[
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
JAτ2
(
ξ,Pν
n
)]
= Eατ1
[
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr lim
n→+∞
↑ JAτ2
(
ξ,Pν
n
)]
= Eατ1
[
e
ηA
∫ τ2
τ1
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
V Aτ2 (ξ)
]
,
(5.35)
concluding the proof of Lemma 5.4.
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Proof of Proposition 2.6
Now that we proved the Dynamic Programming Principle, we move to the existence of the BSDE. We have by definition Z ⊂ Ξ.
To prove the second inclusion, we fix some ξ ∈ Ξ, and define agent’s continuation utility as in (5.19).
By virtue of Lemma 5.4, the family
(
V Aτ (ξ) e
ηA
∫ τ
0
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
)
τ∈T0,T
is a (Pα,F)–supermartingale system.
Therefore, by the results of Lenglart & Dellacherie (1981), it can be aggregated by a unique F-optional process up to
indistinguishability, which coincides with
(
V At (ξ) e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
)
t∈[0,T ]
and remains a (Pα,F)–supermartingale,
which then admits a càd-làg modification since the filtration considered satisfies the usual conditions.
Then, from the admissibility constraint of the contract ξ; that is P? (ξ) 6= ∅, there exists some probability mea-
sure Pα?(ξ) (referred to as Pα? to ease notations) such that V At (ξ) = JAt
(
ξ, Pα
?), for t ∈ [0, T ], and so the
process
(
JAt
(
ξ,Pα
?)
e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a (Pα,F)–supermartingale, for Pα ∈ P, while the processes(
JAt
(
ξ,Pα
?)
e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a
(
Pα
?
,F
)
–UI martingale.
In fact the integrability is guaranteed by the ceiling function in cA and s, together with the admissibility condition on the
contract ξ; for t ∈ [0, T ]
EP
α?
[∣∣∣∣JAt (ξ,Pα?) eηA ∫ t0 (cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr∣∣∣∣] = EPα? [EPα?t [e−ηA(ξ+∫ T0 (s(Xr)−cA(Xr,(α⊗tα?)r))dr)]] ,
≤ KEPα
? [
EP
α?
t
[
e−ηAξ
]]
= KEP
α? [
e−ηAξ
]
< +∞,
(5.36)
where we used again the ceiling function (and thus the boundedness of the exponential term), together with the admissibility
condition on ξ. On the other hand, by the super-martingale inequality and the tower property of conditional expectations, we
have for every t1 ≤ t2 ∈ [0, T ]:
JAt1
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
e
ηA
∫ t1
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr ≥ EPα
?
t1
[
JAt2
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
e
ηA
∫ t2
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr
]
,
= EP
α?
t1
[
EP
α?
t2
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
(
cA (Xr, α?r)− s(Xr)
)
dr
)]]
,
= EP
α?
t1
[
UA
(
ξ −
∫ T
0
(
cA (Xr, α?r)− s(Xr)
)
dr
)]
,
= JAt1
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
e
ηA
∫ t1
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr.
(5.37)
Therefore all the previous terms are equal a.s., in particular, for t ∈ [0, T ]
JAt
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr = EP
α?
t
[
UA
(
ξ +
∫ T
0
(
s(Xr)− cA (Xr, α?r)
)
dr
)]
, (5.38)
which proves that
(
JAt
(
ξ,Pα
?)
e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a Pα?–closed martingale, with a terminal value at T given
by
JAT
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
e
ηA
∫ T
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr = −e−ηA
(
ξ−
∫ T
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr
)
. (5.39)
Then, by the martingale representation theorem, there exists a predictable process Z˜ ∈ H2loc valued in R2 such that
JAt
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr = JA0
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
+
∫ t
0
Z˜sdW
α?
s ,
= JA0
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
E
(
−ηA
∫ t
0
Zr · σ (Xr) dWα
?
r
)
,
(5.40)
33
where
Zt := − σ
−1(Xt)Z˜t
ηAJAt (ξ,Pα
?) eηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,α?r)−s(Xr))dr
, (5.41)
and
E
(
−ηA
∫ t
0
Zr · σ (Xr) dWα
?
r
)
t∈[0,T ]
is a
(
Pα
?
,F
)
–UI martingale. (5.42)
We define
Yt = U−1A
(
V At (ξ)
)
, for t ∈ [0, T ], (5.43)
and our goal is to prove that the pair (Y,Z) is a solution to (2.28), and that Z ∈ V.
Recall that for an arbitrary α ∈ U , the process Y˜ αt := JAt
(
ξ,Pα
?)
e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,αr)−s(Xr))dr is a (Pα,F)–supermartingale.
Replacing JAt
(
ξ,Pα
?) by its representation, we obtain
Y˜ αt
ηA
= 1
ηA
JA0
(
ξ,Pα
?
)
E
(
−ηA
∫ t
0
Zr · σ (Xr) dWα
?
r
)
e
ηA
∫ t
0
(cA(Xr,αr)−cA(Xr,α?r))dr. (5.44)
We apply then Itô formula and Girsanov Theorem, therefore
dY˜ αt
ηAY˜ αt
=
(
cA (Xt, αt)− cA (Xt, α?t )
)
dt− Zt · σ (Xt) dWα
?
t ,
= −Zt · σ (Xt) dWαt −
{(
Zt · µ (Xt, αt)− cA (Xt, αt)
)
−
(
Zt · µ (Xt, α?t )− cA (Xt, α?t )
)}
dt,
(5.45)
and by the supermartingale property and the sign of Y˜ αt we conclude that
α? ∈ argmax
(
Zt · µ (Xt, αt)− cA (Xt, αt)
)
. (5.46)
Finally, applying Itô Formula
Yt =U−1A
(
JA0
(
ξ,Pα
?
))
+
∫ t
0
Zr · σ (Xr) dWα
?
r +
∫ t
0
(cA (Xr, α?r)− s(Xr))dr,
=U−1A
(
JA0
(
ξ,Pα
?
))
+
∫ t
0
Zr · dXr −
∫ t
0
(
Zr · µ (Xr, α?r) + s(Xr)− cA (Xr, α?r)− ηA|σ(Xr)Zr|2
)
dr,
(5.47)
and so the pair (Y,Z), satisfy (2.28). Furthermore, following the line of proof of Briand & Hu (2008)[corollary 4] and using the
integrability assumption on admissible contracts, we obtain
EP
α? [
e(ηA∨ηP )(1+δ) supt∈[0,T ]|Yt|
]
< +∞, (5.48)
with Pα? = Pαˆ from proposition 2.5, which concludes the proof.
5.5 Solving consumer’s problem : optimal contract and capacity payment
From the Proposition 2.6, consumer’s problem is reduced to
V P0 = sup
Y0≥R
sup
Z∈V
JP0
(
Y Y0,ZT ,P
αˆ
)
, (2.30)
so the optimal contract we are looking for is of the form ξ? = Y Y
?
0 ,Z
?
T , with a pair (Y
?
0 , Z
?) ∈ [R,+∞[×V. Using the identity
Y Y0,Z = Y0 + Y 0,Z , we have
V P0 = sup
Y0≥R
sup
Z∈V
[
−e−ηP
(
−Y Y0,Z
T
−ST+
∫ T
0
cP (Xt)dt
)]
,
= sup
Y0≥R
eηP Y0 sup
Z∈V
[
−e−ηP
(
−Y 0,Z
T
−ST+
∫ T
0
cP (Xt)dt
)]
,
= eηPR sup
Z∈V
[
−e−ηP
(
−Y 0,Z
T
−ST+
∫ T
0
cP (Xt)dt
)]
,
(5.49)
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and therefore Y ?0 = R. We can rewrite (2.30) as
V P0 = sup
Z∈V
EP
αˆ
[
UP
(
−Y R,ZT −
∫ T
0
s(Xt)dt+
∫ T
0
cP (Xt) dt
)]
, (5.50)
with the state variables following agent’s optimal response (which we recall is the same as principal’s recommendation) i.e.,
α?t = αˆ
(
XCt , Z
C
t
)
, for t ∈ [0, T ] :Xt =
(
xC0
xD0
)
+
∫ t
0 µ
(
Xr, αˆ
(
XCr , Z
C
r
))
dr +
∫ t
0 σ (Xr) dW
αˆ
r ,
Yt = R+
∫ t
0
(
cA
(
Xr, αˆ
(
XCr , Z
C
r
))
+ ηA2 |σ (Xr)Zr|2−s(Xr)
)
dr +
∫ t
0 Zr · σ (Xr) dW αˆr .
(5.51)
Define then the continuation utility as
V P (t, x, y) := sup
Z∈Vt
EP
αˆ
t,x,y
[
−e−ηP
(
−YT−
∫ T
t
s(Xr)dr+
∫ T
t
cP (Xr)dr
)]
, (5.52)
Observe that Z = 0 is an admissible control and therefore
V P (t, x, y) ≥ EPαˆ(0)t,x,y
[
−eηP YT+ηP
∫ T
t
s(Xr)dr−ηP
∫ T
t
cP (Xr)dr
]
,
= −eηP yEPαˆ(0)t,x,y
[
e
ηP
∫ T
t
(cA(Xr,αˆ(XCr ,0))−cP (Xr))dr
]
,
≥ −eηP y+C(T−t) for some constant C,
(5.53)
where the last inequality follows from the bound
−kx∞ − cA(x∞, αmax) ≤ cP (x)− cA(x, α) ≤ x∞(θ − κ1αmin), for (x, α) ∈ R2+ × [αmin, αmax]. (5.54)
On the other hand, we have
EP
αˆ
t,x,y
[
−e−ηP
(
−YT−
∫ T
t
s(Xr)dr+
∫ T
t
cP (Xr)dr
)]
= −eηP yEPαˆt,x,y
[
e
ηP
∫ T
t
(cA(Xr,αˆ(XCr ,ZCr ))−cP (Xr)+ ηA2 |σ(Xr)Zr|2)dr+ηP
∫ T
t
Zr·σ(Xr)dW αˆr
]
,
≤ −eηP y+x∞ηP (κ1αmin−θ)(T−t)EPαˆt,x,y
[
e
ηP
∫ T
t
Zr·σ(Xr)dW αˆr
]
,
≤ −eηP y+x∞ηP (κ1αmin−θ)(T−t),
(5.55)
where the last inequality follows from the Jensen inequality and the concavity of x 7→ −ex. Therefore, taking the supremum
over Z ∈ Vt, we obtain
V P (t, x, y) ≤ −eηP y+x∞ηP (κ1αmin−θ)(T−t). (5.56)
We can see then that
∣∣V P (t, x, y)∣∣ ≤ eηP y+C(T−t) for some constant C. By standard stochastic control theory (Touzi (2012)),
V P is characterized as the unique viscosity solution of the HJB equation :{
−∂tV P −G
(
x, V P , DV P , D2V P
)
= 0, for (t, x, y) ∈ [0, T )× R3,
V P (T, x, y) = − exp (ηP y) , for (x, y) ∈ R3,
(5.57)
with growth
∣∣V P (t, x, y)∣∣ ≤ eηP y+C(T−t) for some constant C, and G : R2 × R× R3 ×M3 (R)→ R the hamiltonian defined as
G (x, q, p, γ) := sup
z∈R2
g (x, q, p, γ, z) , (5.58)
with
g (x, q, p, γ, z) :=
{
µ
(
x, αˆ(xC , zC)
)
· px +
(
cA (x, αˆ(x, z)) + ηA2 z
ᵀσσᵀ(x)z − s(x)
)
py + ηP q(s(x)− cP (x))
+12σσ
ᵀ (x) : γxx +
1
2z
ᵀσσᵀ (x) zγyy + zᵀσσᵀ (x) γxy
}
.
(5.59)
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Using the change of variable V P (t, x, y) = −eηP (y−u(t,x)), we can simplify the PDE (5.57), and express consumer’s value
function with a 2-dimensional state variable equation instead of 3, that is u : [0, T ]× R2 → R, which is the unique bounded
viscosity solution to {
−∂tu− G¯
(
x,Du,D2u
)
= 0, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R2,
u (T, x) = 0, for x ∈ R2,
(5.60)
where the boundedness is obtained from the growth condition of V P , and with G¯ : R2 × R2 ×M2 (R)→ R defined as
G¯(x, p, γ) := sup
z∈R2
g¯ (x, p, γ, z) , (5.61)
and
g¯ (x, p, γ, z) :=µ
(
x, αˆ(xC , zC)
)
· p+ cP (x)− cA
(
x, αˆ(xC , zC)
)
+ 12σσ
ᵀ (x) : (γ − ηP ppᵀ)− ηA + ηP2 z
ᵀσσᵀ (x) z + ηP zᵀσσᵀ (x) p,
(5.62)
which is strictly concave (and separable) in the control variables zC and zD
g¯ (x, p, γ, z) =µ˜(x)p+ cP (x)− c˜A(x) + 12σσ
ᵀ (x) : (γ − ηP ppᵀ) ,
− κ2
(
xC
)2
2 (αˆ(x
C , zC))2 + αˆ(xC , zC)
(
xCpxC − κ1xC
)
− ηA + ηP2
(
zC
)2 (
σCxC
)2 + zCηP (σCxC)2 pxC ,
− ηA + ηP2
(
zD
)2 (
σDxD
)2 + zDηP (σDxD)2 pxD ,
(5.63)
and so
G¯(x, p, γ) = g¯ (x, p, γ, zˆ(x, p)) , (5.64)
with the maximizer zˆ, that can be expressed explicitly as
zˆ(x, p) :=
(
zˆC(x, p)
zˆD(x, p)
)
, (5.65)
where for sufficiently large |αmax| and |αmin|,
zˆC(x, p) :=
ηP (σCxC)2 + 1κ2
(
xC
xC
)2
(ηA + ηP )(σCxC)2 + 1κ2
(
xC
xC
)2 pxC + κ1κ2
(
xC
xC
)
−
(
xC
xC
)2
(ηA + ηP )(σCxC)2 + 1κ2
(
xC
xC
)2 , (5.66)
and
zˆD(x, p) := ηP(ηA + ηP )
pxD . (5.67)
Remark 5.5. Whenever the truncation coefficients go to infinity x∞, αmax → +∞ and αmin → −∞, we obtain
zˆ (x, p) ≈
 ηP (σCxC)2+ 1κ2(ηA+ηP )(σCxC)2+ 1κ2 0
0 ηP(ηA+ηP )
 p, (5.68)
which can be used as an approximation of (5.65). Similarly, the PDE (5.60) can be approximated by the solution to (5.69)∂tu+
(
µ˜ (x)−
(
κ1
κ2
0
))
·Du+ 12σσᵀ (x) : D2u+ f (x)−
κ21
2κ2 +
1
2ρ (x) ·
(
(∂xCu)
2
(∂xDu)
2
)
= 0
u (T, x) = 0
, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R2, (5.69)
where f : R2 → R is defined as f := c˜A − cP, and
ρ (x) :=

1
κ22
+ 1
κ2
ηP (σCxC)2−ηAηP
(
(σCxC)2
)2
(ηA+ηP )(σCxC)2+ 1κ2
−ηAηP (σDxD)2
(ηA+ηP )
 . (5.70)
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We next proceed by verification to solve the problem
Proposition 5.6 (Verification). (i) Assume that (5.60) has a bounded C1,2([0, T ],R2) solution u. Then there exists a
C1,2([0, T ],R3) solution to the PDE (5.57) denoted v with growth |v(t, x, y)| ≤ eηP y+C(T−t) for some constant C, which satisfies
V P0 ≤ v(0, x0,R). (5.71)
(ii) Define
Z?t := zˆ (Xt, Du (t,Xt)) for t ∈ [0, T ], (5.72)
and assume that (Z?t )t∈[0,T ] ∈ V. Then
V P0 = v(0, x0,R), (5.73)
and
ξ? := R+
∫ T
0
Z?t · dXt −
∫ T
0
H (Xt, Z?t ) dt (5.74)
is an optimal contract.
Proof. (i) Let u be a bounded C1,2([0, T ],R2) solution to the PDE (5.60). Then defining v(t, x, y) := −eηP (y−u(t,x)), we
can see that v ∈ C1,2([0, T ],R3) as a composition of smooth functions, and that v(T, x, y) = −eηP y and v satisfies the growth
condition |v(t, x, y)| ≤ eηP y+C(T−t) for some constant C from the boundedness of u. By straightforward differentiation, we
obtain that v is a solution to (5.57). Define then
βt1,t2 := e
ηP
∫ t2
t1
(s(Xr)−cP (Xr))dr for 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T, (5.75)
and the sequence of stopping times
Tn := T ∧ inf
{
t ≥ 0,
∫ t
0
(β0,r)2
(
|σ(Xr)Dxv(r,Xr, Yr)|2 + (Dyv(r,Xr, Yr))2 |σ(Xr)zr|2
)
dr ≥ n
}
for n ≥ 1. (5.76)
For an arbitrary control z ∈ V, we apply Itô formula and take the expectation under Pαˆ to obtain
EP
αˆ
[βt,Tnv(Tn, XTn , YTn)] =v(t, x, y) + EP
αˆ
[∫ Tn
t
βt,r
(
∂tv + g
(
Xr, v(r,Xr, Yr), Dv(r,Xr, Yr), D2V (r,Xr, Yr), zr
))
dr
]
+ EP
αˆ
[∫ Tn
t
βt,rDxv(r,Xr, Yr) · σ(Xr)dW αˆr
]
+ EP
αˆ
[∫ Tn
t
βt,rDyv(r,Xr, Yr)zr · σ(Xr)dW αˆr
]
.
(5.77)
From the definition of the localizing sequence (Tn)n≥1, we obtain that
0 = EP
αˆ
[∫ Tn
t
βt,rDxv(r,Xr, Yr) · σ(Xr)dW αˆr
]
= EP
αˆ
[∫ Tn
t
βt,rDyv(r,Xr, Yr)zr · σ(Xwr)dW αˆr
]
. (5.78)
Furthermore, since v is a solution to the PDE (5.57), and by the linearity of the expectation
EP
αˆ
[∫ Tn
t
βt,r
(
∂tv + g
(
Xr, v(r,Xr, Yr), Dv(r,Xr, Yr), D2V (r,Xr, Yr), zr
))
dr
]
≤ 0, (5.79)
and so
EP
αˆ
[βt,Tnv(Tn, XTn , YTn)] ≤ v(t, x, y). (5.80)
When n→ +∞, the following a.s convergence holds
βt,Tnv(Tn, XTn , YTn)→ UP
(
−YT −
∫ T
t
s(Xr)dr +
∫ T
t
cP (Xr) dr
)
, (5.81)
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and for n ≥ 1 and the growth condition of v we have
EP
αˆ
[|βt,Tnv(Tn, XTn , YTn)|] ≤ EP
αˆ [
βt,Tne
ηP YTn+C(T−Tn)
]
,
= EP
αˆ
[
e
ηP
∫ Tn
t
(s(Xr)−cP (Xr))dr
eηP YTn+C(T−Tn)
]
,
≤ EPαˆ
[
eC(T−Tn)+ηP (Tn−t)x∞(P (0,x∞)+k1)eηP YTn
]
,
≤ EPαˆ
[
eC(T−Tn)+ηP (Tn−t)x∞(P (0,x∞)+k1)eηP supt∈[0,T ]|Yt|
]
< +∞ for n ≥ 1,
(5.82)
where we used the bound (s(x)−cP (x)) ≤ x∞(P (0, x∞)+k1) for x ∈ R2+ and the estimate on Y from Proposition 2.6. Therefore,
by the dominated convergence theorem,
EP
αˆ
[
UP
(
−YT −
∫ T
t
s(Xr)dr +
∫ T
t
cP (Xr) dr
)]
≤ v(t, x, y), (5.83)
and
sup
z∈V
EP
αˆ
[
UP
(
−YT −
∫ T
t
s(Xr)dr +
∫ T
t
cP (Xr) dr
)]
≤ v(t, x, y). (5.84)
In particular for t = 0, we have an upper bound for the value function V P0
V P0 ≤ v(0, x0,R). (5.85)
(ii) Assuming that (Z?t )t∈[0,T ] ∈ V, we can go over the same steps as in (i) with Z? instead of an arbitrary control from V.
Therefore the inequalities (5.79) and (5.80) and (5.85) become equalities with
V P0 = v(0, x0,R), (5.86)
so that the upper bound is reached for the control Z? which is then an optimal feedback control to the problem (2.30), and
therefore the optimal contract corresponds to terminal value of the controlled state variable
(
Y R,Z
?
t
)
t∈[0,T ]
which we denote
ξ? := Y R,Z
?
T , and which satisfies ξ
? ∈ Ξ since Y0 = R and Z? ∈ V, concluding the proof.
Remark 5.7. The HJB-PDE (5.60) (the same remark can be said about the approximating PDE(5.69)) is a semi-linear
parabolic PDE of second order; with a non-linearity in the gradient term. This PDE has a-priori no solution in the classical
sense, i.e., a smooth function (in C1,2([0, T ],R2)) with a clear definition of ∂tu, Du, and D2u solution to (5.60) because of the
non-linearity. However, the existence can be proved in a weaker sense, by taking the candidate u(t, x) := y − U−1p (V P (t, x, y))
defined in (5.52), which can be proved to be a viscosity solution to (5.60) (not necessarily smooth). In this case one cannot
define ∂tu, and Du, and D2u, and a more technical approach is required. We make the assumption u ∈ C1,2([0, T ],R2) to
simplify the exposition. Nevertheless, (5.60) might satisfy some conditions (unknown to the authors) which insure the regularity
of the viscosity solution defined above.
5.6 Producer’s participation constraint: the problem without capacity payment
The problem (2.38) is a markovian stochastic control problem, and can be solved by classical techniques. We define producer’s
continuation utility function Vˆ A : [0, T ]× R2+ → R as
Vˆ A (t, x) := sup
Pα∈P
EP
α
t,x
[
−e−ηA
∫ T
t
(s(Xr)−cA(Xr,αr))dr
]
. (5.87)
Recall from the definition (2.10) and (2.12) of s and cA that for (x, α) ∈ R2+ × [αmin, αmax] we have the following bounds
0 ≤ s(x) ≤ P (0, x∞)x∞, and αminκ1x∞ ≤ cA (x, α) ≤ cA (x∞, αmax) , and 0 ≤ cA (x, 0) ≤ (a+ b)x∞, (5.88)
so
Vˆ A (t, x) ≤ −e−ηA(T−t)(P (0,x∞)x∞−αminκ1x∞), (5.89)
and since α = 0 is an admissible control, then
Vˆ A (t, x) ≥ EP0t,x
[
−e−ηA
∫ T
t
(s(Xr)−cA(Xr,0))dr
]
≥ −eηA(T−t)(a+b)x∞ , (5.90)
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so ∣∣Vˆ A (t, x)∣∣ ≤ eC(T−t) for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R2+, and some constant C. (5.91)
We identify then a candidate for the solution of the problem with the unique viscosity solution to the HJB equation :{
−∂tVˆ A − Hˆ
(
x, Vˆ A, DVˆ A, D2Vˆ A
)
= 0, in [0, T )× R2,
Vˆ A(T, .) = −1,
(5.92)
with growth controlled by
∣∣Vˆ A (t, x)∣∣ ≤ eC(T−t) for some constant C, (in particular Vˆ A is bounded), where Hˆ : R2 × R2 ×
M2 (R)→ R is the Hamiltonian of the producer acting on his own defined as
Hˆ (x, y, z, γ) := sup
α∈[αmin,αmax]
hˆ (x, y, z, γ, α) , (5.93)
with
hˆ (x, y, z, γ, α) := µ (x, α) · z + 12σσ
ᵀ : γ + ηA(cA (x, α)− s(x))y. (5.94)
Remark that the maximum is attained for
α?pc (x, y, z) := αmin ∨
(
−z
CxC + ηAyκ1xC
ηAy(xC)2κ2
)
∧ αmax, for (x, y, z) ∈ R2+ × R+ × R2 and xC , y 6= 0, (5.95)
(where “pc” stands for participation constraint) and the PDE (5.92) can be written as{
−∂tVˆ A − hˆ
(
x, Vˆ A, DVˆ A, D2Vˆ A, α?pc
(
x, Vˆ A, DVˆ A
))
= 0 in [0, T )× R2+,
Vˆ A(T, .) = −1.
(5.96)
We next proceed by verification.
Proposition 5.8. Assume that the PDE (5.92) has a C1,2([0, T ],R2) solution v with growth controlled by |v (t, x)| ≤ eC(T−t)
for some constant C, then
Vˆ A0 = v(0, x0), (5.97)
and
(
α?pc (Xt, v(t,Xt), Dv(t,Xt))
)
t∈[0,T ] with α
?
pc defined in (5.95) is an optimal feedback control to the problem (2.38).
Proof. Let v be a C1,2([0, T ],R2) solution to the PDE (5.92), such that |v (t, x)| ≤ eC(T−t) for some constant C and
define the sequence of stopping times
Tn := T ∧ inf
{
t ≥ 0,
∫ t
0
(
βα0,r
)2 |σ(Xr)Dv(r,Xr)|2 dr ≥ n} for n ≥ 1. (5.98)
For an arbitrary control α ∈ U , we denote
βαt1,t2 := e
−ηA
∫ t2
t1
(s(Xr)−cA(Xr,αr))dr for 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T, (5.99)
and we have by applying Itô formula and taking the expectation under Pα
EP
α [
βαt,Tnv(Tn, Xn)
]
=v(t, x) + EP
α
[∫ Tn
t
βαt,r
(
∂tv(r,Xr) + hˆ
(
Xr, v(r,Xr), Dv(r,Xr), D2v(r,Xr), α
))
dr
]
,
+ EP
α
[∫ Tn
t
βαt,rDv(r,Xr) · σ(Xr)dWαr
]
.
(5.100)
By definition of the stopping sequence Tn, we have that EP
α
[∫ Tn
t
βαt,rDv(r,Xr) · σ(Xr)dWαr
]
= 0, and since v is a solution to
the PDE (5.92), then
EP
α
[∫ Tn
t
βαt,r
(
∂tv(r,Xr) + hˆ
(
Xr, v(r,Xr), Dv(r,Xr), D2v(r,Xr), α
))
dr
]
≤ 0, for α ∈ U . (5.101)
Therefore
EP
α [
βαt,Tnv(Tn, Xn)
]
≤ v(t, x) for α ∈ U , (5.102)
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Remark then that the following almost sure convergence holds as n→ +∞
βαt,Tnv(Tn, Xn)→ −e
−ηA
∫ T
t
(s(Xr)−cA(Xr,αr))dr
. (5.103)
Furthermore, we have from the growth of v and the bounds in (5.88)
EP
α [
βαt,Tnv(Tn, Xn)
]
≤EPα
[
βαt,Tne
C(T−Tn)] ,
=EP
α
[
e
−ηA
∫ Tn
t
(s(Xr)−cA(Xr,αr))dr
eC(T−Tn)
]
,
≤EPα
[
eηAc
A(x∞,αmax)(Tn−t)eC(T−Tn)
]
< +∞ for n ≥ 1.
(5.104)
So by dominated convergence, we obtain that
EP
α
[
−e−ηA
∫ T
t
(s(Xr)−cA(Xr,αr))dr
]
≤ v(t, x) for α ∈ U , (5.105)
and in particular
Vˆ A0 = sup
Pα∈P
EP
α
[
UA
(∫ T
0
(
s(Xt)− cA (Xt, αt)
)
dt
)]
≤ v(0, x0) (5.106)
So v(0, x0) is an upper bound for the maximization problem (2.38). Furthermore, for
(
α?pc (Xt, v(t,Xt), Dv(t,Xt))
)
t∈[0,T ] and
going through the same steps as previously, the inequalities (5.101) and (5.102) become equalities, and so the upper bound is
reached for αpc which is then an optimal control since it is admissible (as a progressively measurable process w.r.t F valued in
[αmin, αmax]) which concludes the proof.
Remark that the PDE (5.92) can be characterized in terms of certainty equivalent by a straightforward change of variable
Vˆ A(t, x) = −e−ηAuˆA(t,x), which leads to uˆA being the unique bounded viscosity solution to the PDE{
−∂tuˆA − hˆ
(
x,− 1
ηA
, DuˆA, D2uˆA − ηADuˆA(DuˆA)ᵀ, α?pc
(
x,− 1
ηA
, DuˆA
))
= 0 in [0, T )× R2+,
uˆA(T, .) = 0,
(5.107)
and the optimal feedback control is then written (under further smoothness assumptions) as
α?pc
(
x,− 1
ηA
, DuˆA(t, x)
)
= αmin ∨ ∂xC uˆ
A(t, x)xC − κ1xC
xCκ2
∧ αmax. (5.108)
5.7 Description of the numerical procedure
To implement the optimal capacity contract and optimal policy, the first step is to numerically solve the PDE (5.60) describing
consumer’s value function, which we recall{
−∂tu− G¯
(
x,Du,D2u
)
= 0, for (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R2,
u (T, x) = 0, for x ∈ R2+.
(5.60)
We use a finite differences method with an explicit Euler scheme to solve this PDE. We discretize the time horizon [0, T ] by
defining for some nT ∈ N the vector (t0, t2, ..tnT ) with tk = k TnT for k ∈ {0, ..n}. We recall then that the state variables are non
negative and so we define the boundaries of the space using positive constants 0 < xc,min < xc,max and 0 < xd,min < xd,max.
The space grid is of size (nc + 1)× (nd + 1) with nc, nd ∈ N, and for 0 ≤ i ≤ nc and 0 ≤ j ≤ nd, a function M : R2+ 7→ R is
approximated by a matrix M such that Mij represents M(xc,min + ixc,maxnc , xd,min + j
xd,max
nd
).
We define then a collection (Uk){0≤k≤nT } of (nT + 1) matrices of size (nc + 1)× (nd + 1) to stock the (approximation) of the
values of u. Our goal is to have
Ukij = u (k∆t, xc,min + i∆xc, xd,min + j∆xd) for k ∈ {0, ..nT } , i ∈ {0, ..nc} , j ∈ {0, ..nd} . (5.109)
where we defined ∆t := T
nT
, ∆xc := xc,maxnc and ∆xd :=
xd,max
nd
, and recall the following approximations based on taylor
expansion
∂tu(t, x) =
u(t+ ∆t, x)− u(t, x)
∆t + o(∆t),
≈ u(t+ ∆t, x)− u(t, x)∆t ,
(5.110)
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and
Du(t, x) =
( u(t,xc+∆xc,xd)−u(t,xc−∆xc,xd)
2∆xc + o(∆xc)
u(t,xc,xd+∆xd)−u(t,xc,xd−∆xd)
2∆xd
+ o(∆xd)
)
,
≈
( u(t,xc+∆xc,xd)−u(t,xc−∆xc,xd)
2∆xc
u(t,xc,xd+∆xd)−u(t,xc,xd−∆xd)
2∆xd
)
,
(5.111)
and
D2u(t, x) =
(
∂2xCu(t, x) ∂
2
xCxDu(t, x)
∂2xCxDu(t, x) ∂
2
xDu(t, x)
)
, (5.112)
with 
∂2xCu(t, x) ≈ u(t,xc+∆xc,xd)+u(t,xc−∆xc,xd)−2u(t,xc,xd)(∆xc)2 ,
∂2xDu(t, x) ≈ u(t,xc,xd+∆xd)+u(t,xc,xd−∆xd)−2u(t,xc,xd)(∆xd)2 ,
∂2xCxDu(t, x) ≈ u(t,xc+∆xc,xd+∆xd)+u(t,xc−∆xc,xd−∆xd)−u(t,xc+∆xc,xd−∆xd)−u(t,xc−∆xc,xd+∆xd)4(∆xd)(∆xc) .
(5.113)
Inspired by the previous expressions, we define for a matrix M of size (nc + 1)× (nd + 1) the following matrices also of size
(nc + 1)× (nd + 1) (corresponding to the gradient and the Hessian components)
diffxc(M), and diffxd(M) and diff2xc(M) and diff2xd(M) and diffxcxd(M), (5.114)
such that 
diffxc(M)ij :=
Mi+1,j−Mi−1,j
2∆xc ,
diffxd(M)ij :=
Mi,j+1−Mi,j−1
2∆xd
,
diffxcxd(M)ij :=
Mi+1,j+1+Mi−1,j−1−Mi+1,j−1−Mi−1,j+1
4(∆xd)(∆xc)
,
diff2xc(M)ij :=
Mi+1,j+Mi−1,j−2Mi,j
(∆xc)2 ,
diff2xd(M)ij :=
Mi,j+1+Mi,j−1−2Mi,j
(∆xd)2
,
for i ∈ {0, ..nc} , j ∈ {0, ..nd} , (5.115)
with slight changes near the boundaries to avoid out of range indices, i.e., by defining for i ∈ {0, ..nc} and j ∈ {0, ..nd}
M(−1)j := M0j and M(nc+1)j := Mncj and Mi(−1) := Mi0 and Mi(nd+1) := Mind , (5.116)
used in the definition (5.115). We define then the equivalent of the hamiltonian of PDE (5.60) in the space grid as a matrix
valued function G (of size (nc + 1)× (nd + 1)) such that
G(M)ij := G¯
((
xc,min + i∆xc
xd,min + j∆xd
)
,
(
diffxc(M)ij
diffxd(M)ij
)
,
(
diff2xc(M)ij diffxcxd(M)ij
diffxcxd(M)ij diff2xd(M)ij
))
, for 0 ≤ i ≤ nc and 0 ≤ j ≤ nd.
(5.117)
The numerical approximation of (5.60) becomes straightforward, and consists in initializing the terminal value UnTij = 0 for
0 ≤ i ≤ nc and 0 ≤ j ≤ nd. Then computing by backward induction
Uk−1 := Uk + ∆t×G(Uk), for k ∈ {nT , nT − 1, .., 1} . (5.118)
Recall then the definition of the optimal feedback control
Z?t =
(
ZC,?t
ZD,?t
)
:= zˆ (Xt, Du (t,Xt)) for t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.72)
We approximate then
(
ZC,?t
)
t∈[0,T ] and
(
ZD,?t
)
t∈[0,T ] with the collection of matrices (Z
k
c ){0≤k≤nT } and (Z
k
d ){0≤k≤nT } of sizes
(nc + 1)× (nd + 1) defined as(
(Zc)kij
(Zd)kij
)
:= zˆ
((
xc,min + i∆xc
xd,min + j∆xd
)
,
(
diffxc(Uk)ij
diffxd(Uk)ij
))
for k ∈ {0, ..nT } , i ∈ {0, ..nc} , j ∈ {0, ..nd} . (5.119)
Similarly, the recommended effort
(
αˆ(XCt , Z?,Ct )
)
t∈[0,T ] is approximated with matrices (Aˆ
k){0≤k≤nT } of sizes (nc + 1)× (nd + 1)
defined as
Aˆkij := αˆ(xc,min + i∆xc, (Zc)kij) for k ∈ {0, ..nT } , i ∈ {0, ..nc} , j ∈ {0, ..nd} . (5.120)
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Remark 5.9. For a fixed k ∈ {0, ..nT }, the matrices Uk, (Zc)k, (Zd)k and Aˆk represent approximations on the whole space
R2+. So for a given x = (xC , xD) ∈ R2+, one needs first to find the indices (i, j) such that (xc,min + i∆xc, xd,min + j∆xd) ≈ x;
for example by taking (i, j) =
(⌊
xC−xc,min
∆xc
⌋
,
⌊
xD−xd,min
∆xd
⌋)
to estimate the required quantities, for example u(k∆t, x) ≈ Ukij .
The second step in the simulation is the forward diffusion of state variables using the optimal controls for a number of scenarios
N , to use the Monte-carlo for the estimations. We recall the dynamics of the controlled state variablesXt =
(
xC0
xD0
)
+
∫ t
0 µ
(
Xr, αˆ
(
XCr , Z
C,?
r
))
dr +
∫ t
0 σ (Xr) dW
αˆ
r ,
Yt = R+
∫ t
0
(
cA
(
Xr, αˆ
(
XCr , Z
C,?
r
))
+ ηA2 |σ (Xr)Z?r |2−s(Xr)
)
dr +
∫ t
0 Z
?
r · σ (Xr) dW αˆr .
(5.121)
This is also done through an explicit Euler scheme, which we provide for a single scenario. We define the matrix Xˆ of size
2 × (nT + 1) and the vector Yˆ of size 1 × (nT + 1) which provides Xˆk ≈ Xk∆t and Yˆ k ≈ Yk∆t. We start by initializing
Xˆ0 :=
(
xC0
xD0
)
and Yˆ 0 := R. Then we compute by induction for k ∈ {1, ..nT }:

(i, j) :=
(⌊
(xc,min∨Xˆk−11 ∧xc,max)−xc,min
∆xc
⌋
,
⌊
(xd,min∨Xˆk−12 ∧xd,max)−xd,min
∆xd
⌋)
,
Generate a (normalized) 2 dimensional Brownian increment (∆W )k with a law N (02, I2),
Xˆk := Xˆk−1 + ∆tµ
(
Xˆk−1, Aˆk−1ij
)
+
√
∆tσ
(
Xˆk−1
)
(∆W )k ,
Yˆ k := Yˆ k−1 + ∆t
(
cA
(
Xˆk−1, Aˆk−1ij
)
+ ηA2
∣∣∣∣∣σ (Xˆk−1)
(
(Zc)k−1ij
(Zd)k−1ij
)∣∣∣∣∣
2
− s(Xˆk−1)
)
+
√
∆t
(
(Zc)k−1ij
(Zd)k−1ij
)
· σ
(
Xˆk−1
)
(∆W )k .
(5.122)
Remark that it is fundamental that for each time step k, the Brownian increment used to compute Xˆk is the same as the one
to compute Yˆ k.
The resulting matrices correspond to a realization for a scenario of the capacity and demand (Xˆk1 and Xˆk2 ) for k ∈ {0, ..nT },
and Yˆ nT the the contract for this scenario. Prior values of Yˆ , i.e., Yˆ k for k < nT could be used to understand the composition
of the contract, but are only informative and less important than Yˆ nT which represents the actual amount paid, since the
contracting is in a lump-sum payment form.
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